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This paper concerns an NGO intervention in agricultural commodity markets known 
as “Fairtrade”.  Fairtrade pays producers a minimum unit price and provides capacity 
building support to member cooperative organizations. Fairtrade’s organizational 
capacity support targets those factors believed to reduce the commodity producer’s 
share of returns. Specifically, Fairtrade justifies its intervention in markets like coffee 
by claiming that market power and a lack of capacity in producer organizations 
‘marks down’ the prices producers receive.  As the market share of Fairtrade coffee 
grows in importance, its intervention in commodity markets is of increasing interest. 
Using an original data set collected from fieldwork in Costa Rica, this paper assesses 
the role of Fairtrade in overcoming the market factors it claims limits producer 
returns. Features of the Costa Rican input market for coffee permit a generalization of 
the results.  The empirical results find that market power is a limiting factor in the 
Costa Rican market and that Fairtrade does improve the efficiency of cooperatives, 
thereby increasing the returns to producers. These results do not depend on the 
minimum price policy of Fairtrade and therefore can inform on its organizational 
support activities. Finally, the results also suggest that producers selling to vertically 
integrated, multinational coffee mills face lower producer price ‘mark-downs’ 
compared with domestically owned non-cooperative mills. This result contradicts the 
popular view that the increasing concentration of vertically integrated multinational 
firms accounts for a decline in producers’ share of coffee returns. 
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I.  Introduction 
Fairtrade 
Since the original Oxfam ‘Fairtrade’ shop opened in the UK in 1964, Fairtrade 
organizations trading in everything from textiles to coffee grew to achieve global 
retail sales of over US$83 million in 2003 (NEWS 2005). Agricultural commodities 
traded under Fairtrade auspices include coffee, cocoa, tea, rice, sugar, honey and fresh 
fruit. Fairtrade enjoyed average annual growth rates of 3.3% throughout the 1990s 
(EFTA 2001) and by 2005, the net value of all Fairtrade products sold in Europe had 
increased by over 150% (FINE 2005).  Although the total value of Fairtrade accounts 
for little over 0.01% of global trade, Fairtrade continues to grow in importance in 
individual commodity markets, particularly that of coffee. Fairtrade coffee accounts 
for an average of 0.5% of the US market, the world’s largest coffee market (Raynolds 
2004). Market share in some European countries is much higher: In 2005, roughly 6% 
of the Swiss coffee market was Fairtrade and in the UK, Fairtrade now accounts for 
fully 20% of the market (FINE 2005). The demand for Fairtrade coffee has 
consistently grown at a faster rate than that of conventional coffee for a number of 
years. This is as true for older markets in Europe (where annual average growth of the 
European Fairtrade coffee market was almost seven percent  throughout the 1990s 
(Max Havelaar 1998), as it is for younger markets: The average growth rate of the 
Fairtrade coffee market is 65% and 47% for the Canadian and US markets, 
respectively, since the introduction of Fairtrade coffee in North America in 1998.  
While clearly capturing the imagination of consumers, the advent of Fairtrade on the 
agricultural commodity scene can actually be traced to its concern for the producer 
side of the market. The intervention of Fairtrade with commodity producers is based 
on a number of perceived market failures that are claimed to lower the return to 
farmers and expose them to a high degree of volatility. In this, the Fairtrade position 
is far from new: Commodity policy research has diagnosed, examined and prescribed 
policy in the face of falling and volatile prices for decades. This has been particularly 
true for the coffee market, which has known several crises since the 1960s. The most 
well-known interventions in coffee markets have been the supply retention schemes 
aimed at supporting and stabilizing prices through international commodity 
agreements (ICAs).  
Fairtrade and Commodity Policy in Coffee 
The global causes for the most recent crisis in coffee, dating from at least the early 
1990s, include structural changes to supply and demand. These factors, combined 
with the effective demise of (US and Brazil-backed) coffee ICAs in 1989, have led 
coffee commodity policy in new directions. In particular, much of the new policy is 
aimed at increasing the share of existing returns to coffee producers through improved 
efficiency and access to higher valued markets. The volatility issue is addressed with 
market-based price risk management tools. It will be seen that the effectiveness of this 
policy strategy depends critically on delivering the associated price risk management 
and marketing tools to producers. This delivery can be limited by the difficulty in 
reaching many small, non-organized producers. It can also be limited by imperfect 
market structures, where market power and failures in information can prevent higher 
returns from reaching farmers. Furthermore, whereas improved efficiency is touted by 
‘new’ commodity policies as a means to alleviate the current crisis for farmers, it is   2
not always clear where the scope for efficiency improvement lies.  Fairtrade, with its 
similar focus on producer organizations and higher valued markets, 
 should also face 
these same limitations. On the contrary, Fairtrade has enjoyed sustained growth and 
maintained its intervention in coffee—a phenomenon that came to draw increasing 
attention in commodity circles.
1 
Fairtrade and Development  
Since over 40% of all agricultural workers worldwide are engaged in agricultural 
commodity production, the crisis in commodities affects over one billion producers. 
Fully one-quarter of these commodity producers are engaged in coffee production in 
less developed countries (LDCs).  A ‘coffee crisis’ is therefore a crisis of 
development. To face this development issue, Fairtrade intervenes in coffee markets 
to increase the returns to coffee producers. They do this directly through the provision 
of a minimum price for a portion of the harvest, but they also engage in a range of 
development activities aimed at removing the factors that mark down producer prices 
for coffee. These factors include the market power of coffee buyers in local input 
markets, the inefficiency of cooperative producer organizations with which they work, 
and the limited direct access of producers to export markets.   
In light of the resonance of Fairtrade activities within the wider policy context, it is 
worthwhile to assess the role of Fairtrade in overcoming these factors in commodity 
markets. Nevertheless, despite a burgeoning analytical literature on Fairtrade in 
development studies circles (Leclair 2002;Murray, Raynolds, and Taylor 
2003;Raynolds 2004;Renard 2003;Strong 1997;Tallontire 2002), the fundamental 
premises justifying Fairtrade intervention have never been empirically examined. This 
paper therefore undertakes to inform on the following research question: What is the 
role of Fairtrade in overcoming the market factors claimed to limit producer returns 
in internationally traded agricultural commodities like coffee?  
The paper will first discuss the nature and extent of Fairtrade intervention in 
agricultural commodity markets (Section II), with a particular focus on the coffee 
market. Section III then briefly summarizes recent developments in international 
commodity policy more broadly. Section IV reviews the key features of Costa Rica as 
a case study. The theory and data used to approach the above research question form 
the topics of Sections V and VI, respectively.   Section VII undertakes an econometric 
analysis to identify the presence of market failures limiting producer returns. This 
section also analyses the impact of Fairtrade and other agents in the Costa Rican 
coffee market on producer returns. Section VIII discusses the policy implications of 
the econometric findings before concluding with a summary and directions for future 
research. 
 
   
                                                 
1 The commodity price risk management group of the World Bank, for example, consulted heavily with 
Fairtrade organizations in its early work and Fairtrade coffee cooperatives continue to be their primary 
clients.    3
II.  Fairtrade  
Defining Fairtrade 
Broadly speaking, ‘Fairtrade’ refers to a trademarked trading relation between 
organizations of smallholder producers
2 in LDCs and consumers in the North.
3 While 
Fairtrade takes place with both agricultural commodities and other goods (e.g. 
handicrafts) this analysis deals exclusively with Fairtrade in commodities.
4 Final 
products like roast and ground coffee (e.g. Cafédirect, Equal Exchange), tea bags (e.g. 
Clipper Fairtrade) and chocolate (e.g. Green&Blacks, Divine Chocolate) made from 
primary commodities purchased under Fairtrade conditions are identified to the 
consumer with a Fairtrade trademark.
5 These Fairtrade conditions, as spelt out by the 
Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO), include: purchase from 
cooperatively organized producer groups only; the payment of a minimum ‘Fairtrade’ 
price; long-term trading relations; the advance of credit and a transparent use of 
Fairtrade premiums on the part of the producer organization.
6   
To use the trademark, buyers (which are a mix of Fairtrade non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and private firms) must (i) purchase their primary commodity 
input under Fairtrade conditions from the FLO register of approved smallholder 
farmer organizations and (ii) pay a license for the trademark.  On the supply side, in 
order to provide quality products in sufficient quantity and in a timely fashion, the 
cooperative farmer organizations receive capacity building support from NGO 
‘Fairtrade organizations’ operating in the South. These Fairtrade NGOs also often 
have a ‘trading arm’ through which they behave as buyers.  Fairtrade organizations, 
their producer partners and private firms participating in the trademark system 
together constitute ‘Fairtrade’.  
Fairtrade: Tools and Approaches 
Fairtrade is a trading relationship structured with the objective of alleviating the 
poverty of agricultural commodity producers in LDCs “by offering better trading 
conditions for producers and workers in developing countries” (Transfair 2004).  
Those trading conditions that Fairtrade proponents believe limit returns to farmers 
                                                 
2 Recently (2003) Fairtrade trademarked goods have come to include trade in goods produced by 
organized workers (e.g. on plantations). This is a development outside the time frame of analysis of this 
paper, and in any event, remains a very small portion of Fairtrade activity. 
3 It is important to acknowledge that, with the growing success of Fairtrade in Northern markets, a 
number of initiatives such as ‘ethical trade’, ‘community trade’, and non-trademarked ‘fair trade’ have 
arisen. These are separate from the main Fairtrade movement described here. 
4 This is done without any loss in generality: The same development principles underlie Fairtrade in 
both commodities and handicrafts. Furthermore, commodities account for the majority of Fairtrade 
activity in both value and volume terms (Piepel, Koppe, and Spiegel 2000).  
5     The Fairtrade trademarks, which identify a product on the supermarket shelf as 
having met a specific set of ‘Fairtrade’ criteria, as spelt out by the Fairtrade Labelling Organization 
(FLO). 
6 See the FLO website for a complete set of  Fairtrade standards and criteria. www.fairtrade.net/pdf/sp/ 
english/ Generic%20Fairtrade%20Standard%20SF%20Dec% 202005%20EN.pdf   4
(and foster poverty) include the low and variable output prices of world markets and 
low and imperfectly competitive input prices paid to farmers by middlemen (Barrat-
Brown 1993;EFTA 1995;EFTA 2001). From this comes the ideological support of 
cooperative organizations. The idea is to support cooperatives so that they are 
transparent, accountable and efficient. Such support then creates viable alternative 
trading channels for smallholder farmers to sell their coffee. This is important as low 
returns are often blamed on monopsonistic intermediaries. In sum, selling to 
cooperatives is meant to raise the returns to farmers by increasing their share of the 
prevailing world price. Further improvements to producer returns motivate further 
capacity building, technical support and efficiency work with cooperatives from 
Fairtrade NGOs that work directly with producer groups in the South.  
In addition to this capacity building by Fairtrade organizations, licensed buyers in the 
North pay a fixed minimum price for the primary commodity purchased from these 
producer groups (e.g. US$1.26/lb for Arabica coffee).  The intention of the fixed price 
mechanism is to reduce producer exposure to volatility and low world prices. The 
extent to which it does, of course, is limited by the proportion of the producer groups’ 
harvest sold to the Fairtrade market, which is rarely 100% of the harvest, and is in 
most cases well below 50%. 
In sum, it is important to stress that Fairtrade utilizes a two-pronged strategy to assist 
commodity producers: Price support through the minimum ‘fair’ price and producer 
organizational support.  
Fairtrade Intervention in Coffee 
In many ways, the story of Fairtrade can be told in terms of coffee.  Although 
Fairtrade in other agricultural commodities has achieved significant market share, 
coffee has remained the single most important Fairtrade product in terms of both 
value and volume since the first Fairtrade coffee activities in 1973 (EFTA 1995;EFTA 
2001;Piepel, et al. 2000;Raynolds 2004).  Coffee is not only important for growth in 
value, but in the mainstreaming of Fairtrade more generally. For example, it was in 
response to a call from coffee producers that Fairtrade criteria were harmonized under 
one trademark organization (Murray, et al. 2003) and the mainstream distribution of 
Fairtrade products in supermarkets was pioneered by coffee in the late 1990s.
7 It is 
also through coffee that the current two-pronged model of Fairtrade intervention in 
commodity markets was originally developed.  
For most people, Fairtrade is usually synonymous with a ‘fair price’. The minimum 
price is the central and most contentious
8 criteria of the Fairtrade conditions 
governing coffee. It is certainly the most well-known. Table 1 indicates the minimum 
price for different coffee origins. In times of low prices, the Fairtrade price difference 
can be considerable: For example, in the crisis of the early 1990s, the Fairtrade price 
for Central American washed Arabica was on average 38 US cents/lb higher than the 
prevailing world price (as measured by the New York ‘C’ price). When the relevant 
                                                 
7 Until then, distribution of Fairtrade products had been channeled through so-called ‘World Shops’ 
and through church groups and catalogues. 
8 The fair price can be contentious because it is rather arbitrarily determined. There are references made 
to covering costs of production and basic needs, but little in the way of specifics. For example, the 
minimum price schedule of Table 1 has been unchanged for 15 years i.e. no adjustment for inflation.    5
world price rises above the Fairtrade minimum price, the Fairtrade price becomes: the 
world price plus US$0.05/lb. Finally, note from Table 1 that not all Fairtrade coffee is 
organic, but a higher minimum price prevails if it is. 
Table 1 The Fairtrade Minimum Price for Coffee (US cents/lb) 
Conventional (US cents/lb)  Certified Organic (US cents/lb)   
 













washed Arabica  126  124  141  139 
non-washed Arabica  120  120  135  135 
washed Robusta  110  110  125  125 
non-washed Robusta  106  106  121  121 
Source: Adapted from FLO 2004 
The minimum prices in Table 1, along with a commitment to trade for more than one 
season and the advance of credit, stipulate the requirements of buyers. Producers, or 
rather their organizations, are required to retain US$0.05/lb out of the minimum price 
(referred to as the ‘Fairtrade premium’) and to “administer the Fairtrade premium in a 
way which is transparent for beneficiaries and FLO. Decisions on the use of the 
premium are taken democratically by the members” (FLO 2004, p.4). In practice, 
producer organizations can decide to retain more than US$0.05/lb and tend to spend 
this on organizational capacity building, social programs, services for members, 
specific infrastructure projects and/or quality programs (Ronchi 2002a; Ronchi 
2002b).  
The formal standards for Fairtrade coffee (see footnote 6) make it clear that producer 
organizations must meet a further host of labor and quality standards.
9 In turn,  
Fairtrade organizations like Twin, Equal Exchange, Oxfam (until 2003), Traidcraft 
and others, provide a large variety of producer support activities in order to help 
producer groups meet the quantity and quality requirements for export, not only to 
Fairtrade markets, but to conventional markets as well. This reduces their dependence 
on limited Fairtrade coffee demand
10 and enables them to access conventional 
premium markets as well (e.g. organic).   
                                                 
9 These requirements provoke critics of the Fairtrade system to point out that Fairtrade seems to be 
reserved for smallholder producer organizations that are already strong and independent.  The system is 
endogenous, however: Many of the FLO-registered producer organizations can meet the stringent 
criteria only as a result of the capacity building and producer support they receive from NGO Fairtrade 
organizations, as described above. 
10There is an excess producing capacity of Fairtrade coffee of some 80% (Giovannucci, et al. 2003).   6
III.  ‘Fairtrade’ and Commodity Policy 
Agricultural Commodities in Crisis 
Coffee is a commodity whose real price has displayed above-average volatility and a 
general decline that culminated, in 2000, to the lowest price (in real terms) in almost 
100 years (Varangis, Siegel, Giovanucci and Lewin 2003c). In addition to being the 
single most valuable agricultural commodity and the second most valuable traded 
commodity (after oil) in the world for most of the latter half of the 20
th century (Ponte 
2002b), coffee carries a great weight in terms of employment and poverty.  This is 
partly because coffee is one of the few agricultural commodities dominated by small 
producers: Some 10 million small
11 coffee farmers produce 70% of the world’s coffee 
(CFC 2001).   
In response to ‘crises’ characterized by a persistent negative trend and increasing 
volatility of prices, most agricultural commodity markets have known some form of 
international, national or local intervention over the course of the last century. These 
policies have often had mixed objectives with respect to downward price trend and 
high volatility. This ambiguity over precise objectives is closely linked to the 
controversies that exist in the large body of research on agricultural commodity 
markets.  Commodity policy research has been characterized by less than perfect 
agreement over the long run trend of prices, as well as over its volatility over time. 
The detection of a downward trend in prices has been hotly disputed, primarily due to 
weaknesses in the statistical tests for trend (Grilli and Yang 1988, Cuddington and 
Urzua 1989, Powell 1991, Gilbert 2003, Leon and Soto 1997, Cashin and McDermott 
2001, Cashin, et al. 2003). Similarly, while the detection of commodity price 
volatility in the literature is not controversial, debate does exist over whether that 
volatility has been increasing over time or not, as well as its underlying causes (see, 
for example, Cashin, et al. 2001;Varangis, et al. 2003c, Gilbert 2003;Hazell, 
Jaramillo, and Williamson 1990;Scandizzo and Diakosawas 1987).  
Although there is no consensus on the negative trend and increasing volatility in 
agricultural commodity prices in general, there is little ambiguity in the literature over 
the negative trend and increasing volatility of coffee prices in particular. (see Cashin, 
et al.2000,  2003 for trend and Gilbert 2003, Hazell, et al. 1990 for volatility). Even 
the most casual observation of Figure 1 shows that both features of interest, 
downward price trend and high volatility, are markedly present in the coffee market. 
                                                 
11 By ‘small’ is meant coffee farmers producing on less than 10 hectares of land.   7


















































Source: ICO, WDI; author’s own work 
 
In light of the dramatic behavior of coffee prices and the significance of agricultural 
employment in the commodity, it is unsurprising that a wide range of policy 
interventions have been conceived and applied to coffee. These span international 
commodity agreements (ICAs), marketing boards, stabilization funds and national 
price controls.  
Traditional Commodity Policies in Coffee 
Coffee has known a series of ICAs since the negotiation of the first in 1962. The ICAs 
were supply retention schemes aimed at maintaining and stabilizing coffee prices 
within a determined band of prices.  The agreement included both producing and 
consuming countries and, unlike other major commodity agreements such as those for 
tin, cocoa and rubber that used buffer stock schemes, it functioned via a system of 
export quotas based on export volume and stocks of the producing countries. Quotas 
were activated when a composite average price calculated by the International Coffee 
Organization (ICO) dropped below a series of specified trigger prices.  It was, in fact, 
disagreement about the size and distribution of these quotas that led to a suspension of 
the first ICA in 1972.  In the face of depressed prices induced by supply responses to 
the post-1976 frost plantings and the failure of other unilateral initiatives at retaining 
supply, a new ICA was negotiated that took effect in 1980. Interrupted only by 
temporary price-induced suspensions, this agreement held until its final collapse in 
1989. A further effort at an agreement took place with a much reduced membership 
and no retention clauses in 1994, but the US refused to join even this toothless coffee 
ICA.  At the same time, some coffee producers formed the Association of Coffee 
Producing Countries (ACPC), which initiated a number of supply retention initiatives 
in the second half of the 1990s. The most recent supply management measure in 
effect is the 5% poor quality retention plan of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Colombia.  
                                                 
12 Real price index constructed using annual average ICO indicator prices for the ‘Other Milds’ 
category, deflated by WDI (World Development Indicators) US price deflator.   8
While some studies found stabilizing effects for the earlier coffee ICAs (Akiyama and 
Varangis 1990), their main success appears to have been in supporting prices 
(although the role of supply shocks in Brazil on price peaks were arguably just as 
important).  These gains, however, have been qualified by studies that claim that 
despite unmistakable price stability , the coffee ICA in effect before the 1985 drought 
dampened the subsequent price peaks with its accumulated stocks (Akiyama, et al. 
1990). Furthermore, theory and evidence on rent-seeking activity induced by intra-
country quota distribution indicate that there are welfare losses  that mitigate ICA 
price gains (Bohman, Jarvis, and Barichello 1996). These rent-seeking activities, in 
combination with the internal quota distribution systems within countries that tended 
to favor large producers (Akiyama, et al. 1990) and facilitate the exercise of market 
power (Lopez and You 1993), called into question whether small coffee producers 
actually enjoyed any of the ICA-induced boost in price and coffee revenues (Gilbert 
1995;Oxfam 2001a). This essentially casts doubt on the agreements’ effectiveness in 
raising producer incomes.   
In addition to the international supply retention schemes, individual countries adopted 
a number of domestic policies in an attempt to dampen volatility and support prices in 
coffee markets. These efforts included the formation of quasi-governmental 
institutions, marketing boards and caisses de stabilisation.  Marketing boards, most 
commonly parastatal organizations with a legal monopsony on the purchase of coffee, 
completely controlled the sector and guaranteed a fixed producer price, which usually 
averaged the return over all producers. Marketing boards may also have a stabilization 
fund built in or the stabilization fund can be the unique policy instrument, whereupon 
the system is described as a caisse de stabilisation. The caisse de stabilisation does 
not trade in the commodity but determines the prices and mark-ups for all actors in 
the marketing chain.  The division of rents usually includes a portion for the 
government and for a stabilization fund  that is used to support producer prices in 
times of low prices and is financed by surplus years (EIU 1991). While marketing 
boards and stabilization funds were often effective in stabilizing prices, the cost in 
terms of depressed producer prices was found to be excessive. Evidence of this 
includes the almost universal rise in producer prices after market liberalization from 
marketing board control (Akiyama, et al. 2001;Dorin 2003). The inefficiency of 
marketing boards led them in some cases to administer producer prices that were 
further below the free market price by more than the amount producers would have 
been willing to pay to avoid risk in the free market in the first place (McIntire and 
Varangis 1999). 
The wider context of market liberalization programs in LDCs from the 1980s onward 
led to a reduction in the role of government in all areas of the economy, including in 
commodity policy. In this context, commodity markets were restructured, inefficient 
marketing board practices were eliminated, high export tax formulas were revised or 
removed, as were consumer (domestic) price distortions (World Bank 1990).  
Following the collapse of the coffee ICA in 1989, however, the release of retained 
stocks of coffee onto the market precipitated a further dramatic and persistent fall in 
prices in the early 1990s. In the face of this deepening crisis, national policy 
initiatives initially reverted to include known measures. These included price support 
through the establishment of emergency funds; the restructuring of producer debts, 
and the provision of credit for both coffee and diversification activities. Despite these 
efforts, however, at the end of the last millennium, the average volatility of coffee   9
prices
13 was still among the highest of all agricultural commodities (Gilbert 2003) and 
by 2003, coffee prices had remained below the cost of production for most of the 
world’s 25 million coffee producers for the third harvest in a row (TechnoServe 
2003).   
The ‘New’ Commodity Policy Context 
The apparent unsustainability of the ICAs, the observed inefficiency of many 
marketing boards and the limited success of domestic interventions in raising 
producer prices and reducing their exposure to volatility led commodity policy in new 
directions.  Increasingly, in the place of traditional commodity policies, came a new 
generation of policy prescriptions that accepted the failure of efforts to support or 
increase the size of coffee returns and to stabilize its volatility. The policy focus 
shifted instead to market-based coping strategies for its persistent price volatility and 
to the distribution of existing revenues.  In this emphasis on redistribution, the ‘new’ 
commodity policy is supported by a burgeoning literature from the ‘value chain’ 
perspective.   
Value chain analysis has been widely applied to coffee (de Graff 1986;Fafchamps, 
Vargas Hill, Kaudha, and Nsibirwa 2002;Fitter and Kaplinsky 2001;Kaplinsky 
2003;Losch 1999;Mendoza 1996;Pelupessy 1999;Pelupessy and van Tilburg 
1994;Ponte 2002a;Ponte 2002b;Talbot 1997a;Talbot 1997b).  Broadly speaking, value 
chain analysis concerns itself not only with a description of the input-output structure 
and geographical coverage along a (productive) chain, but also with the general 
institutional and governance context in which the chain exists (Gereffi 1994).  As part 
of this wider analysis, value chain studies of coffee will often break down the final 
(retail) price of a unit of coffee into ‘shares’ of either income or profit, depending on 
the data available.  Since the most readily available data pertains to income as 
opposed to profit (due to the sensitivity of cost data), most value chain analyses draw 
policy conclusions about the distribution of income along the chain.  With few 
exceptions, these analyses of the coffee chain find that the farmer’s share of total 
income generated along the chain has been falling over time.
14  As long as income 
data is used, it is not possible to empirically distinguish costs and therefore, to identify 
factors such as market power or changing cost structures. This is probably why value 
chain analyses largely rely on the correlation or coincidence of these income shares 
with factors such as market structure (usually in the form of concentration figures). 
This has led much of the value chain literature on coffee to single out the rise of large, 
vertically integrated multinational firms as the primary cause for the decline in 
producer shares of coffee income.  
In addition to this preoccupation with distribution and shares of coffee rent, the new 
policy initiatives aim at coping with volatility by drawing on an existing menu of 
price risk management tools such as swaps, forward contracts and options on the 
                                                 
13 Volatility is measured in Gilbert (2003) as the standard deviation of the annual changes in the log of 
the deflated prices for coffee.  
14  This conclusion is mostly drawn from deterministic measures of income, not profit, and can be 
derived either over many years  from data averaged across importing and exporting countries (so that 
what is obtained is necessarily an average distribution across many, potentially different, actors) or 
within a specific country, but over a shorter period of time (see, for example, Fafchamps, et al. (2002), 
Pelupessy 1999, de Graff 1986,  Mendoza 1996).   10
futures markets. Unfortunately, price risk management tools such as futures market-
based instruments can require prohibitively large volumes, entail high transaction 
costs and certainly require a specialized level of expertise.  As such, the single most 
important limitation to recent commodity risk policies is the lack of organization 
among producers (Dehn, Gilbert, and Varangis 2003;Gilbert 2003). This is, in fact, a 
recurring limitation to the application of the ‘new’ commodity policies. In the case of 
price volatility strategies, this limitation is confirmed by test cases conducted by the 
World Bank: Technical assistance and training are cited as one of the basic 
prerequisites for the effective implementation of the new price risk management 
policies, but providing these to producer organizations can be prohibitively time 
consuming and costly (Varangis and Lewin 2003b).   
In terms of the downward trend in coffee prices, commodity policy came to rely 
largely on market-based measures and interventions that aim to raise the returns to 
coffee through improved profitability and competitiveness (Varangis, et al. 2003c, 
p.26) or to diversify those who can no longer participate in the coffee market. Policy 
measures aim either to increase returns to producers through the earning of premiums 
(profitability) or through the reduction of production and transaction costs 
(competitiveness). First, the measures for adding value through premium earnings 
include: improving the quality of coffee to access specialty niche markets such as the 
gourmet and organic markets, and improving the marketing, reputation and brand 
management of different origins (IADB, The World Bank, and USAID 2002). The 
improvement of quality as a major policy initiative can also be seen in the ICO’s 
Coffee Quality-Improvement Program, which establishes minimum quality standards 
for both Arabica and Robusta.  In addition to improving returns, quality improvement 
has also been shown to stimulate domestic coffee consumption and thereby boost 
demand (see the example of Brazil in Varangis, et al. 2003c). Second, 
competitiveness is encouraged through policies aimed at cost reduction, primarily 
through productivity advances and the reduction of transaction costs through more 
direct trade. More direct trading relations, however, again require greater 
organizational development of producers in order to permit more direct access to 
retailers and traders.  Third, in acknowledgment that some producers will not be able 
to achieve greater competitiveness or access higher quality/higher profitability niches 
of the market, a related strand of policy focuses on diversification efforts from the 
coffee activity. The role for government in assisting diversification strategies is here 
identified: market research, technical assistance, improving labor mobility and 
providing credit support would assist the effective implementation of diversification 
policy. Finally, institutional reform is recommended for the provision of ‘safety nets’ 
for poor producers and, importantly, coffee laborers (Varangis, et al. 2003c).   
Commodity Policy and Fairtrade 
There are three important limiting factors to the new wave of commodity policy, 
particularly as it pertains to coffee.  First, with respect to increasing the returns to 
producers through a reduction in costs (as opposed to price support) it does not 
provide any insight on what the scope for these gains might be. Many coffee 
producing countries (e.g. Brazil and Costa Rica) are already highly mechanized 
and/or have seen important productivity gains with agro-chemical and technology 
packages. It is not clear where further gains are to be had.    11
Second, while it learns from the failure of supply retention and price support schemes 
to sustainably raise the returns to coffee, the prescribed avenue of increasing farmer 
incomes through quality premiums relies, at least on the second order, on perfect 
input markets. This has been recognized in agricultural commodity policy more 
generally:  Models for the incomplete price transmission of tariff policies and market 
reforms in the presence of market power have already been developed and applied to 
a variety of agricultural commodity markets (MacMillan, Rodrik, and Welch 
2002;McCorriston 2003;McCorriston and Sheldon 1996). Its relevance to the new 
breed of coffee commodity policy is clear: Strategies aimed at improving the returns 
to coffee through quality premium earnings can address the ‘crisis’ of low incomes 
for producers only to the extent that price transmission is complete.
15 Incomplete 
price transmission is often the consequence of imperfect competition in the marketing 
chain.  The issue of market power is, in fact, acknowledged in policy documents: One 
of the benefits of quality improvement policies is to strengthen the bargaining position 
of exporters and to “increase their ability to negotiate prices…” (Varangis, et al. 
2003c, p.25). A World Bank study on linking smallholder farmers to markets 
identifies the potential of market power as a key characteristic of agricultural 
commodity markets (Bienabe, et al. 2004). In sum, all of the activities aimed at 
increasing the premiums earned on coffee production rely on efficient price 
transmission to producers. While this is acknowledged, ( “…it is vital that 
promotional policies focus on the local benefits – rather than the price premium or 
market benefits” (Varangis, et al. 2003c, p.31)), the consequence for policy in 
markets characterized with market power are not explored or addressed in the new 
commodity policy context.  
Third, the application of market-based price risk management strategies to dealing 
with price volatility depends critically on the organizational development of producers 
(Bienabe, et al. 2004;Varangis, et al. 2003c).This is also true for new policies aimed 
at raising producer returns through the reduction of transaction costs by eliminating 
middlemen and increasing direct dealing with retailers (Varangis, et al. 2003a).  
Producer organizations such as cooperatives have been identified as critical 
prerequisites for both strands of policy. One of the limitations of such policies is the 
cost associated with building the capacity to the high level of quality and quantity 
demanded by the market. It is precisely the perceived difficulty of delivering the 
necessary organization and capacity to producers that has proved to be a limitation to 
the ‘new’ commodity policies (Gilbert 2002;TechnoServe 2003;Varangis, et al. 
2003a): 
Many producer organizations often do not have the skills, capital, or dedicated 
personnel to take on the market oriented roles of middlemen. Although training 
individuals in such organizations may be helpful in terms of achieving market 
                                                 
15 Empirical work on price transmission has tended to refer to the transmission of variability (Hazell, 
Jaramillo, and Williamson 1990) and is often used to assess the success or failure of stabilization 
schemes (for an example, see Cardenas 1994). If the price intervention is constant, such as constant 
export taxes or consistent market power mark-downs, these studies would still permit perfect price 
transmission of price variability. So for example, Cardenas finds perfect price transmission in Costa 
Rica, where stabilization schemes are not in effect, but where market power may be present. For 
coffee, in particular, studies have found that price transmission from world to domestic (producer) 
prices to be low, both relative to other commodities (Mundlak and Larson 1992), and in absolute terms 
(Quiroz and Soto 1995).   12
transparency, it is often a difficult and lengthy process for them to become 
effective at other market intermediation roles (Varangis, et al. 2003a, p.27) 
In fact, in a survey of the ‘new’ coffee crisis policy menu, TechnoServe discards the 
policy initiatives that require producer organization as too difficult to implement 
(TechnoServe 2003). Policy makers like the World Bank, however, have found the 
expertise and experience required to do so in the NGO community.
16 This has been 
particularly true of ‘Fairtrade’ organizations.  
NGO experience in commodity markets has been extensive and varied. While many 
NGOs still actively work to revive defunct policy tools such as ICAs and price 
support schemes, some, including Fairtrade NGOs, engage in activities that are key to 
the new generation of policies aimed at managing risk, improving market access and 
promoting diversification from coffee (Bebbington, et al. 1993;Bienabe et al. 2004).  
Fairtrade organizations based in developed and developing countries alike are found 
to be working in the organization and strengthening of agricultural producer 
organizations, particularly in coffee (Oxfam 2001b;Villasenor 2000). Fairtrade 
grassroots support of farmers has included: Organizational and marketing capacity 
building for rural producer organizations, technical assistance for improving quality 
and developing organic capacity, agricultural diversification, gender and environment 
programs (Oxfam 2001b). In brief, Fairtrade organizations had already developed 




                                                 
16 Varangis, P., World Bank, personal communication. 
17 Varangis, P. World Bank, personal communication.   13
IV.  ‘Fairtrade’ and Market Failures  
It was seen that the demise of international price support arrangements has led coffee 
commodity policy in new directions; focusing less on the support and stabilization of 
low and volatile prices, and more on enabling producers to increase their share of 
existing returns and to cope with volatility. Coffee commodity policy has increasingly 
turned to market oriented solutions in helping producers to cope with low and volatile 
coffee prices.  These solutions, however, have been seen to depend on (i) an 
appropriate scope for efficiency improvements; (ii) the structure of the market (for 
pass-through of higher returns to farmers); and (iii) the availability of producer 
organizations to deliver the policy tools described in the section above. In these 
respects, the new commodity policies reflect something of the motivation and modus 
operandi of the ‘Fairtrade’ intervention in commodity markets like coffee.  They also 
reflect a market failures approach to development.  
Market Failures in Development 
Assessing the role Fairtrade in commodity input markets is one that is rooted in the 
‘information theoretic’ strand of development economics. This strand centers on 
the role of market failures in development, underdevelopment and policy 
formation. By ‘market failure’ is simply meant the failure of the market to achieve 
efficient allocation: There are some gains from trade that are not realized. There 
are many sources of market failure, including market power, increasing returns to 
scale, externalities, missing markets and matching and coordination problems 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1992). In the literature on development and market failures,  
Stiglitz assigns a central role to the missing or imperfect market for information  as 
the  source of most market failures (Stiglitz 1989).  
Market power is one of the most important market failures cited for agricultural 
markets. Consolidation and increased concentration in the food industry have been 
carefully documented for both the U.S. (Sexton 2000) and Europe (McCorriston 
2002). From early days, observations on market structure downstream from 
agricultural production have motivated empirical and theoretical attention to the 
issue of market power in agriculture (Hoffman 1940;Nicholls 1941). In addition to 
market structure concerns, Sexton and Rogers argue forcefully that several typical 
characteristics of raw agricultural commodity markets should make the analysis of 
imperfect competition in these markets routine. These characteristics include the 
bulky and perishable nature of agricultural products, producers’ geographic 
immobility, and the sunk cost aspect of specialized crops (Rogers and Sexton 
1994, p.1143). This is not to say that market power should be presumed in these 
markets. Rather, the point made by Sexton and Rogers is that policy for and 
analyses of agricultural markets must establish something about competition: In 
brief, that “imperfect competition matters to agricultural economists” (McCorriston 
2002). Notably, imperfect competition consistently figures in any discussion of the 
crisis facing coffee producers.  
In examining the role, if any, of Fairtrade in overcoming market failures in 
commodity trade, the analysis identifies and rests on the two central tenets of an 
information theoretic approach to development policy: First, market imperfections 
naturally give rise to a variety of  interventions; and second, these interventions must 
be based on an accurate understanding of the underlying cause of the problem in order   14
to be effective (Hoff, Braverman, and Stiglitz 1993). As a result, the empirical 
analysis of Section VII attempts to detect the presence of market failures that are 
blamed for low producer returns (e.g. market power) and identify any role of Fairtrade 
in overcoming these and other market factors that limit the returns to producers in 
agricultural commodity markets (e.g. inefficiency). 
Measuring Market Power as a Market Failure 
Market power is defined as deviations from marginal cost pricing.  Since Bain’s 
seminal work on market structure, conduct and performance (SCP) (Bain 1951), 
empirical work concerning market power and imperfect competition has commanded 
much attention in the industrial organization literature. In the SCP paradigm, the 
measurement of market power was linked to the structure of the particular market and 
some measure of performance in that market. The SCP paradigm was criticized on a 
number of fronts, but most importantly by Demsetz (1974).  Demsetz asked whether 
industries become concentrated because of efficiency advantages of some firms over 
others: Higher profitability margins (however unreliably these are measured) may 
therefore be due to lower costs, rather than marked up prices. New modeling efforts 
arose in response to this and other critiques of the SCP paradigm. There was a move 
away from establishing concentration as the determinant of market power and towards 
structural efforts at accurately measuring market power itself. These efforts became 
known as the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) literature.  
In its recognition that price-cost margins are not often observable from accounting 
data, the NEIO instead estimates behavioral equations with parameters intended to 
reveal industry conduct. From early days, most of the theoretical and empirical NEIO 
work focused on output markets (Appelbaum 1982; Braverman and Gausch 1986; 
Bresnahan 1981; Bresnahan 1982; McCorriston 1993; Sumner 1981). The extension 
to input markets was largely due to the work of agricultural economists (Azzam 1997; 
Durham and Sexton 1992; Hyde and Perloff 1994; Just and Chern 1980; Lopez, et al. 
1993; Wann and Sexton 1992).  In simplest terms, the theoretical underpinnings of the 
structural NEIO models draw on oligopoly/monopoly theory to estimate a parameter 
whose value reveals if the firm or industry is exhibiting market power. The parameter 
is estimated from the first order condition of the profit function. Consider total 
revenue (TR)  
TR = P x Q 
then,  
MR =  Q
TR
∂




∂         (1) 
Clearly, if the firm is perfectly competitive,  Q
P
∂
∂ is equal to zero. If it is allowed that 
the seller may have some market power, equation (1) may be more generally written 
as perceived marginal revenue (MRp): 












where h(.) includes all the demand side parameters and exogenous variables that 
might affect marginal revenue (Bresnahan 1982) and λ is a new parameter indexing 
the degree of market power. At equilibrium, the profit maximizing firm equates 
(perceived) marginal revenue with marginal cost (c’(.)): 
P + λh ( . ) =     c ’ ( . )           
P = c’(.) - λh ( . )         ( 3 )  
The parameter λ is obtained by jointly estimating an equation like (2) with the 
competitively determined demand equation for the firm’s output. Both the demand 
function and the supply relation underlying the cost function in (3) must assume a 
specified functional form, whence the use of ‘structural’ in describing NEIO models.   
While this section does not pretend to summarize the vast NEIO literature, it can 
serve to flag for the analysis critical issues in identifying market power. Consider the 
market power parameter λ in (3) as an industry average conduct parameter (although 
it can be made firm specific to facilitate price leadership models, etc.). In its general 
form of (3), if λ = 0, this implies perfect competition, and if it were equal to 1, it 
would indicate monopoly. This intuitive understanding of the NEIO approach is 
incomplete without an identification procedure for λ.  Econometrically, in a 
simultaneous set of supply and demand equations, this is the problem of rendering  λ 
separately estimable. Economically, this is the problem of distinguishing between 
market power and efficiency.   
An excellent algebraic exposition of the identification problem can be found in 
Bresnahan (1982), but a visual intuition can be had from Figure 2 below. In particular, 
the figure illustrates the difficulty in observationally distinguishing between an 
equilibrium with a perfectly competitive, but less efficient firm from an equilibrium 
characterized by a more efficient but imperfectly competitive firm.  Figure 2 is a 
monopsony adaptation of Bresnahan (1982). 
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Suppose that perfectly competitive firms and a monopsonistic firm had different 
linear
18 demand (D1 for the less efficient firm and D2 for the more efficient firm) and 
supply curves positioned such that the same set of price and quantity (E1) could be a 
result of monopsony or perfect competition. If supply were to shift outward (S1 to S2), 
and the equilibrium were to move from E1 to E2, the two structures would still be 
observationally equivalent.  Figure 2 illustrates the central difficulty in all empirical 
attempts to measure market power when marginal cost is not directly observable.   
The NEIO literature therefore measures market power through the econometric 
identification of the λ parameter.
19 
NIEO models have been applied to both monopoly and monopsony (Azzam and 
Pagoulatos 1990; Azzam and Schroeter 1991a; Durham, et al. 1992; Just, et al. 1980).  
They have been extensively refined to include dynamic theories of noncooperative 
behavior (Green and Porter 1984; Rotemberg and Saloner 1986); to test for both input 
and output market power simultaneously (Atkinson and Kerkvliet 1989; Azzam, et al. 
1990; Schroeter 1988); and at estimating market power in multiple markets (Hyde and 
Perloff 1998; Raper, Love, and Shumway 2000), thereby permitting the detection of 
market structures like cooperative bilateral monopoly (Raper, et al. 2000). Finally, 
structural models have also been developed for industries that deviate from the 
perfectly competitive framework by permitting differentiated products (Allen 1998) 
and output price uncertainty (Azzam and Schroeter 1991b). In contrast to the 
extensive refinement of NEIO market power measurement, empirical work on the 
determinants of market power has received less attention in the NEIO literature. This 
was identified early on as an important field of further research: “…although the 
NEIO has had a great deal to say about measuring market power, it has had very little, 
as yet, to say about the causes of market power” (Bresnahan 1989, pp.1053-1054).  
NEIO studies that do examine the determinants of market power typically estimate 
values for the market power parameter and then use their estimates as the dependent 
variable in a regression model. In much of this work the ‘causes’ of market power are 
often linked back to market structure, either explicitly through the inclusion of market 
structure variables as independent variables (Gallet 1996; Luo 2002) or implicitly by 
examining market power in input and output markets simultaneously. A few studies, 
however, do conduct a wider investigation (Buschena and Perloff 1991; Lopez, et al. 
1993). In a study of monopsony market power for Haiti, for example, Lopez and You 
specify the growers’ supply curve and the demand curves for domestic and export 
markets and estimate a single term, λ, for each year. This parameter serves as a 
dependent variable that is then regressed on exogenous variables that include 
institutional policy factors, coffee ICAs, the number and size of exporters and general 
state-of-the–nation variables. Interestingly, they found that concentration ratios and 
association formation did not effect the NEIO market power measures, whereas 
effective periods of ICA quota (that is, those periods where the quota was binding) 
                                                 
18 The exposition holds even if demand/supply curves are not linear; Lau derives the extensive demand 
and cost conditions under which λ is identified (Lau 1981).  
19 For monopoly, the use of a supply side exogenous variable that interacts with price (the slope of the 
supply curve) as well as entering into the estimated equation on its own (as a shifter) makes the λ 
parameter identifiable and estimable (Bresnahan 1982).   
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did appear to lead to greater collusion among exporters, resulting in lower producer 
prices.  
Each of the NEIO models described assumes a functional form for demand and cost 
curves and derives the various tests for market power (λ) based on first order profit 
maximizing conditions. The reliance of all these studies on the functional forms they 
assume provide the main thrust of criticism of the structural NEIO models, as the 
results have often been found to be sensitive to the functional form assumed ( Bulow 
and Pfleiderer 1983, Herrmann and Sexton 1999, Hyde, et al. 1994, Tyagi 1999). 
Arguably, the functional form critique can be attenuated by adopting flexible 
functional forms (for an example, see Bettendorf and Verboven 2000) or by modeling 
the demand and cost relationship more carefully. Nevertheless, the consequences of 
any misspecification, no matter how carefully minimized, have been found to be 
significant. Varian characterizes the problem as one of a joint hypothesis: “whatever 
one wants to test plus the maintained hypothesis of functional form” (Varian 1983, 
p.99).
20   
While efforts at avoiding functional form specification  have been extensively 
developed (Afriat 1972, Driscoll, Kambhampaty, and Purcell 1997; Hall 1988; 
Hanoch and Rothschild 1972; Hyde, et al.; Roeger 1994; Varian 1984; Varian 1985), 
in non-structural and nonparametric models, these models also suffer from the 
identification problem illustrated in the NEIO discussion  of Figure 2.  Broadly 
speaking, non-structural models (Hall 1988; Hyde, et al. 1994;Roeger 1995) estimate 
a parameter that measures the mark up of monopoly price over marginal cost. These 
parameters are estimated from any deviation between the observed growth in 
(normalized) output and the expected growth, given the observed growth in 
(normalized) labor input. In contrast, based on its use in production theory (Afriat 
1972;Hanoch and Rothschild 1972; Varian 1985), nonparametric tests for market 
power use the comparative statics of different observations within a revealed 
preferences framework.  By relying on the evaluation of differences between 
observations, the non-structural analyses must somehow control for any other changes 
(besides those which would identify market power) between observations. Using 
Monte Carlo experiments, nonparametric models were tested for their ability to 
correctly detect the presence of market power. Unsurprisingly, only those models that 
control for structural shifts, explicitly include costs and permit technical change, were 
found to correctly identify market power. Unfortunately, even when this class of 
models is compared to structural models for market power, they are found to be 
“more prone to misspecification of market power direction and are not as accurate at 
detecting market power magnitude as their parametric counterparts (Raper, et al. 
2000, p.2273).  
                                                 
20 Concerns have also been raised over possible misspecification when non-competitive behaviour is 
specified for only one side of the market (Azzam and Pagoulatos 1990). In Monte Carlo simulations, 
one-sided NEIO models were recently found to correctly estimate no market power on the side of the 
market they analyse, even when imperfect competition occurs on the other side (incorrectly assumed to 
be competitive) (Raper et.al. 2000). In other words, one-sided models may miss the boat by restricting 
imperfect competition to one side of the market, but the misspecification does not affect market power 
parameter estimated. In fact, Raper et. al. have found that nonparametric models are more prone to this 
source of misspecification than their structural counterparts in the NEIO (see below) (Raper and 
Noelke 2004).    18
The empirical measurement of market power is the subject of a vast literature and 
much intellectual effort, yet it highlights the difficulties inherent in measuring market 
failures. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the information theoretic approach to 
development, centered as it is on market failures, has more extensive theoretical 
treatments than empirical studies. Nevertheless, empirical examples cited in the 
literature consistently indicate that development policies ostensibly aimed at 
correcting for failures in the market must be carefully aimed at the specific market 
failure. This, in turn, calls for an identification of the failure, which is not always 
empirically straightforward. Nevertheless, given the recent thrust of commodity 
policy and the growing importance of Fairtrade as a development intervention in 
commodity markets, some empirical quantification of the market factors claimed to 
limit producer returns is called for in an assessment of Fairtrade as a development 
tool. 
V.  Fairtrade and Costa Rican Coffee: An Empirical Case Study 
Costa Rica as a case study 
There are three reasons for choosing Costa Rica as a case study for the assessment of 
Fairtrade intervention in agricultural commodity markets. First, at the time of case 
study selection (1999) Costa Rica was one of the few countries in which Fairtrade 
intervention had been present in a systematic way for a relatively substantial period of 
time. Although Fairtrade had engaged in sporadic projects and interventions in Latin 
America since the late 1960s, Costa Rica was one of the first countries to enjoy a 
concerted Fairtrade intervention effort from at least 1989 onwards.  
Second, Costa Rica has enjoyed a long history of political stability since the 
conclusion of its 40-day civil war in 1948. This makes a time series analysis ‘cleaner’ 
in terms of noise within the observations.    
Third, Costa Rica introduced legislation (Law 2762) with the explicit intention of 
protecting the coffee farmer from potentially ‘exploitative’ practices related to market 
power. Furthermore, Costa Rica’s institutions and regulations are widely considered 
to be healthy, with strategies and programs for the sector that are relatively clear and 
strong (Varangis, et al. 2003c). If evidence is found that there is a ‘Fairtrade effect’ in 
Costa Rica, where the regulatory framework exists to overcome market power and 
market policies are generally considered favorable for producers, then the analysis 
becomes informative for intervention in countries where social and farmer protection 
is non-existent, or at least not up to the levels of Costa Rica.  
Coffee in Costa Rica 
Costa Rica is known for its high quality Arabica coffee and usually enjoys positive 
quality differentials on top of the New York ‘C’ futures price. Historically, coffee in 
Costa Rica has been very important, both in terms of GDP and in the wider 
development of the country. It was the sole export between 1840 and 1890 and funded 
everything from schools to roads since the Costa Rican declaration of independence in 
1848 (EIU 1998). In the 1980s and first half of the 1990s, coffee accounted for an 
average of 20% of exports and five percent of GDP (ICO 1997). By the dawn of the 
new millennium, coffee’s share in export revenue had fallen to five percent, some 
1.3% of GDP (Varangis, et. al. 2003c). This limited macro significance, however,   19
belies the important sectoral and rural impact of coffee: Small producers have always 
constituted the vast majority of coffee producers in Costa Rica. In 2000, 92% of 
coffee farmers had fewer than 5 ha of land, producing 45% of the nation’s coffee. The 
average farm size in Costa Rica is small: 1.4 ha (ECLAC 2001).   Even as banana 
replaced coffee as Costa Rica’s primary export earner in the 1980s, coffee remains the 
most important sector for employment in agriculture (EIU 1998). In 2000, even after 
coffee production had fallen due to the prolonged crisis of the 1990s, 28% of the rural 
labor force was still employed in coffee (Varangis, et al. 2003c).  
Since the early 1980s, Costa Rica has among the highest yields in the world due to the 
use of a ‘technological package’ including dwarf trees and intensive use of 
agrochemicals. It also, however, has the highest costs of production in Central 
America (Varangis, et al. 2003c), owing in part to its highly technical source of 
productivity, and partly to high costs of labor in socially protective Costa Rica.  The 
capital-intensive primary processing sector in Costa Rica is organized into modern 
wet processing mills that further contribute to the consistency in quality of Costa 
Rican coffee. 
Law 2762 regulates the production and sale of coffee in Costa Rica.  The law is 
executed by the research and regulatory body, Icafé (Instituto de Café de Costa Rica). 
Icafé is officially independent from the government, but does receive revenue support 
from the government and collects income tax on coffee for the Ministry of Revenue. 
For the purposes of agricultural research, Icafé classifies coffee within Costa Rica 
according to a mix of geographic, altitudinal and quality criteria. This results in seven 
Icafé grades of bean: Low Grown Atlantic (LGA), High Grown Atlantic (HGA), Hard 
Bean (HB), Medium Hard Bean (MHB), Good Hard Bean (GHB), Pacific (P) and 
Strictly Hard Bean (SHB). Given the quality of Costa Rican coffee, the international 
market assigns each grade to one of two types (or ‘origins’) of beans from Costa Rica: 
HB and SHB.  The various bean grades are grown across the country, in one of nine 
coffee growing regions (see Figure 4 below).   
Coffee cherries are sold as fruit in volume units of double hectoliters (dHl). Mills 
process cherries into kilograms of ‘green coffee’. It is largely green coffee which is 
exported to be roasted and packaged in importing countries. By law in Costa Rica, 
producers must sell their coffee cherries to an Icafé-registered processing mill within 
24 hours of harvesting. This reinforces the geographic segmentation of the Costa 
Rican market in transportationally challenged areas outside the Central Valley.  The 
100 or so active mills across the country can, in turn, only buy cherries from farmers 
(as opposed to buying from middlemen), or they may produce part of their harvest on 
their own plantations.   
The vast majority of mills employ a wet processing system in a sophisticated 
industrial plant with maximum processing capacities per harvest ranging from 15 000 
to 350 000 dHL of coffee cherries.  The mills may be domestically owned, form part 
of a multinational firm or may be cooperatively owned by farmers. At the time of the 
case study, there are roughly 50 exporters in Costa Rica, many of which are vertically 
integrated with the mills (see Figure 3). There are some 30 roasters who produce 
predominantly for the domestic market. Costa Rican exports of roasted coffee are well 
below one percent of its green coffee exports.   
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Law 2762 regulates the selling process: Farmers are asked to produce their identity 
papers with every deposit of cherries at a mill and they must receive a receipt for it. In 
this way, there is a record of all coffee sold to a mill. After processing the cherries, 
mills must then register all sales contracts for green coffee, whether for export or 
domestic sale, with Icafé. They must register the sale of coffee even if the mill is also 
the exporter or roaster.  The quantities from the registered sales contracts can then, if 
necessary, be verified by the recorded (receipted) quantity of coffee sold by farmers to 
mills. In theory, this verification can control for mills trying to sell coffee that was 
purchased ‘under the table’ from (illegal) middlemen.  According to Law 2762, mills 
should also provide agricultural input services such as limited credit and/or input 
acquisition facilities to all producers, although in practice, this only occurs for large 
producers.   
Several factors contribute to a competition for volume of cherries among mills in the 
Costa Rican coffee market, so that at first glance, the reasons for hypothesizing 
imperfect competition at the farm-gate in Costa Rica are not apparent. First, in the 
general context of an international market characterized by a move towards last 
minute production by roasters requiring large and ready volumes of coffee, mills and 
exporters in Costa Rica, as elsewhere, benefit from size. Second, by centralizing the 
processing of coffee off-farm, mill processing in Costa Rica takes place in industrial 
plants that clearly have a cost-minimizing efficiency point of production. In actual 
fact, a recent study identifies that most processing mills in Costa Rica are operating 
on the increasing returns to scale (IRS) portion of their long run average cost curves 
(Mosheim 2002).  This simply supports the oft-made observation that Costa Rica has 
an over-capacity in coffee processing. Finally, in the years with binding ICA quotas, 
Icafé allocated Costa Rica’s quota to mills according to the average size of the last 
two harvests, providing further incentive to compete for volume of coffee cherries.  
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A number of key factors limit the benefits of mill competition for farmers. First, the 
use of modern mills with minimum volume requirements implies that some regions of 
the country may only be able to support a limited number of mills (natural 
monopsony). These regions, if outside the Central Valley, may also be geographically 
segregated markets due to poor transportation infrastructure, thereby further limiting 
the competition for coffee cherries that might otherwise take place if mills (or 
farmers) were to travel.  Second, competing for coffee cherry output requires a high 
liquidity, since payments in advance of the harvest must be made to producers in 
order to secure volumes.  Historically, this has been a problem for cooperatives, 
whose social activities limit their available capital. The liquidity issue was 
exacerbated for mills more generally with an end to special arrangements with the 
banks for financing the coffee sector in the 1980s. The liquidity constraint on the 
advance payment system clearly has implications for competition: More liquid firms 
can secure volume, not by bidding up the price, but by advancing higher portions of 
the final price. On the one hand, this may amount to a desirable provision of credit for 
farmers. On the other hand, interview evidence and independent studies of the Costa 
Rican coffee market (Garro 2000; Hazell 2000) concur that large advances are taken 
by farmers to imply higher final prices. This expectation of higher prices based on 
higher advances, however, does not always materialize.   
In addition to the technological and financial factors that may potentially limit 
competition in the market for coffee cherries, the geography and infrastructure of the 
country also play a role. Some 44% of the national coffee growing area is in the hands 
of smallholder farmers: 92% of producers have coffee farms under five hectares in 
size whilst the two percent that have farms of more than 20 hectares account for 35% 
of the coffee growing area (ICO 1997). These large farms are almost all located in and 
around the Central Valley (Ardon 1980), leaving the more remote regions of the 
country’s coffee growing to smallholders. This is potentially problematic due to the 
limited access to transportation available to these regions. In 1995, only 17% of roads 
in Costa Rica were paved and the national number of cars per 1000 households (urban 
and rural) was 114.
21  On the other hand, it should be noted that coffee grown in the 
Central Valley does benefit from the infrastructure centered on the nation’s capital, 
which is located there; almost 50% of the nation’s coffee is grown in the Central 
Valley, including the high altitude Los Santos regions (see Figure 4).   
Producer prices in Costa Rica 
In addition to regulating the roles of different actors in the coffee market, Icafé also 
undertakes the annual calculation of farm-gate prices. Farm-gate prices refer to the 
price that each mill must pay farmers for every unit of coffee cherry purchased.  As 
mentioned, the pricing policy of Icafé, as stipulated in Law 2762 came about in 
response to concern over potential market power abuse by mills.
22  While recognizing 
that Costa Rican processors/exporters are perfectly competitive in the output market 
(that is, they are price takers in the international coffee market), the fear was that 
input prices for cherries were being paid below their value marginal product at a 
monopsonistic price.  Icafé therefore regulates the marketing margin of processed 
green coffee to ensure an input price for farmers exactly equal to their value of 
                                                 
21 World Bank Development Indicators (WDI Online), 2006. 
22 Jimenez, A. University of Costa Rica, personal communication.   22
marginal product. They do this by calculating the average processing costs (APC) for 
different sized mills in different locations. Mills may deduct only these (non-cherry 
costs) from their output contract prices. By assuming that all mills are operating at the 
minimum of their long run average cost curves (where APC is equal to marginal 
processing costs—see next section), Icafé attempts to ensure that mills earn strictly 
normal economic profit.    
The farm-gate prices thus calculated are then published in the leading national 
newspaper, La Nación. These are the minimum farm-gate prices that must be paid 
within two weeks of their publication. As explained, mills will have already paid a 
portion of this price in a first, and possibly, second installment on the promise of 
paying a final installment to the level of the published price (and not necessarily the 
price promised to producers at the beginning of the harvest). Public knowledge of 
these prices tends to ensure their payment.  
Fairtrade in Costa Rica 
Fairtrade intervention in Costa Rica takes place through nine cooperatively owned 
mills in three geographically distinct regions of the country. As Figure 4 shows, 
Fairtrade intervention is concentrated in and around the marginal region of 
Guanacaste, where seven of the cooperatives are located. One cooperative is located 
in the far south of the country and the remaining cooperative is the only one to be 
located near the infrastructurally blessed Central Valley, where almost 50% of the 
nation’s coffee is grown. 
The story of Fair Trade in Costa Rica began with coffee as a partnership between the 
Fairtrade organization, S.O.S. Werelhandel, and the tiny cooperative CERRO AZUL. 
Today, the Costa Rican coffee Fairtrade partnership has expanded to include eight 
other cooperatives besides CERRO AZUL, forming a secondary level, service-
rendering exporting association, Coocafé (El Consorcio de Cooperativas de 
Caficultores de Guanacaste y Montes de Oro R.L). There are therefore two levels of 
producer organizations on the Fairtrade coffee scene in Costa Rica: Coocafé as a 
consortium and the nine primary level cooperatives that own and control it.  The nine 
cooperatives are small, collectively accounting for 2.5% of Costa Rica’s national 
output in coffee. 
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Figure 4 Fairtrade and Coffee in Costa Rica 
For almost half of the period of Fairtrade intervention in Costa Rica (1989-2000), the 
world price rose above the minimum Fairtrade price of US$1.26/lb, so that the 
Fairtrade price was only US $0.05/lb over the prevailing market price.  





































Source: author’s own work 
 
The low prices of the early 1990s mean that Coocafé has owed a considerable portion 
of its revenues to the Fairtrade market.  Although data is not available for the full 11   24
years of Coocafé’s activity , cross-referenced data for seven harvests from 1993-2000 
confirm that an average, in volume, of 50% of Coocafé’s coffee was exported to 
Fairtrade markets.  These figures are higher in value terms.  In 1997-98, for example, 
Fairtrade exports amounted to some 67% of their green coffee export revenue.  
Table 2 Proportions of Coocafé Exports to Fairtrade and Conventional Markets 
Harvest Year  Fairtrade   Conventional 
1993-94 55%  45% 
1994/95 57%  43% 
1995/96 52%  48% 
1996/97 48%  52% 
1997/98 49%  51% 
1998/99 58%  42% 
1999/2000 29%  71% 
Source: Coocafé, author’s own work  
The difference between the Fairtrade and world price earned on a portion of the 
cooperatives’ combined harvest is divided equitably among the nine cooperatives:  
Half of the coffee destined for Fairtrade markets is divided into nine identical 
‘solidarity quotas’.  In addition to their solidarity quota, the remaining half of the 
volume exported to the Fairtrade market is distributed to the cooperatives in ratios 
based on their average volume of production of the last three harvests. Exactly 30% of  
Fairtrade premiums go to a capitalization fund from which the cooperatives can 
borrow, and the remaining 70% goes to the Producers’ Fund.  Over the ten years of 
operation between 1989 and 1999, the producer’s fund has distributed over US$1.25 
million of Fairtrade green coffee export revenues to some 4 000 affiliated small coffee 
producers and their families (Ronchi 2002a).  
As with all Fairtrade interventions, the impact of Fairtrade on Coocafé and its nine 
cooperatives can be divided between the price effect (of Fairtrade premiums) and the 
impact due to its capacity building activities and producer support (Ronchi 2002a; 
Ronchi 2002b).  Perhaps the most important impact of non-price Fairtrade producer 
support is the development and establishment of Coocafé’s own export arm. It was 
seen that commodity policy is increasingly concerned with facilitating more direct 
trading relations for coffee producers. Exporting to the conventional market, however, 
requires consistency in quality, efficiency, market access and professional trading 
capacity within a producer organization. Through extensive training and capacity 
support with the UK-based Fairtrade NGO, Twin, Coocafé achieved independence in 
1997 from the Costa Rican exporters it had hitherto relied upon.  
VI.  The Model  
Fairtrade intervention in commodity markets takes the form of capacity-building for 
producer cooperatives and ‘fair price’ contracts for the commodity.  From an 
information theoretic approach to development, successful intervention must be 
targeted to specific market failures.  At the microeconomic level, the Fairtrade 
movement claims that factors such as market power and weakness or inefficiency in 
producer organizations contribute to low producer prices and poverty.  This section 
outlines the model that will be used to test for the presence of the market factors used 
to justify Fairtrade intervention in the Costa Rican coffee market. The model provides 
three testable hypotheses that are then econometrically tested in the following section.   25
Icafé, mill marketing margins and producer prices 
In its supervision of the coffee market in Costa Rica, Icafé recognizes that Costa 
Rican processors/exporters are perfectly competitive in the output market (that is, they 
are price takers in the international coffee market) but embodies a concern that input 
prices for cherries can be paid below their value marginal product at a monopsonistic 
price.  Icafé therefore regulates the marketing margin (the difference between the 
price received by mills/exporters and that received by farmers) of processed green 
coffee to ensure an input price for farmers exactly equal to their value of marginal 
product, ensuring that mills earn only a normal economic profit.  Figure 6 
heuristically illustrates the Icafé approach.  
Figure 6 Mill Processing Cost Curves and Margins 
 
APCIcafé represents the total marginal processing (i.e. non-cherry) cost at the mill’s 
cost-minimizing point of its long run average processing cost curve. Icafé explicitly 
assumes that all mills have had the opportunity to adjust all inputs, including their 
level of fixed capital (the mill itself), and calculates the costs of different sized mills
23 
at the minimum point
24 of their (long run) average processing cost curve.  The 
variable p* is the perfectly competitive international benchmark price for green coffee 
from Costa Rica. The variable pp is the producer price paid by the mill to the farmer 
for coffee cherry. The expository framework of Figure 6 closely follows the approach 
of Stiegert et. al. in their NEIO study of the US beef packing industry (Stiegert, 
Azzam, and Brorsen 1993). In that study, the authors assume a fixed proportional 
relation between the agricultural input and processed output and illustrate their 
                                                 
23 In calculating processing costs, Icafé does not assume that all mills have the same long run average 
cost curves, but that each mill is at MES of its respective cost curve.  
24 Icafé is explicit about calculating APCIcafé at the MES point, in order for the cost study to serve as 
an efficiency guide for mills (Torres 1978;Torres 1982;Torres 1983) and to ensure that mills are 
operating in such a way as to guarantee that farmers are receiving their value marginal product (VMP). 
This is why APCIcafé  is often referred to as ‘minimum costs’ in their literature (Icafe 1991;Icafé 







b = APCIcafé 
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argument by graphing the ‘marketing margin’ of processing firms.
25 The difference 
between the green coffee output price and cherry input (producer) price is the 
marketing margin (p*-pp), which is measured on the y-axis. Quantity of cherries is 
measured on the x-axis. The long run marginal processing cost (MPC) and average 
processing cost (APC) curves in Figure 6 refer to all processing costs from farm-gate 
to port, exclusive of the cost of cherries. 
For as long as the mill is operating at its cost-minimizing level (BB at quantity of 
cherries, q1), the long run APC calculated by Icafé (APCIcafé) is also the mill’s long 
run MPC.  As such, at point BB, the marketing margin, b, is exactly equivalent to the 
minimum average processing cost, APCIcafé, and more importantly at that point, to the 
MPC. Since point BB is at a point of constant returns to scale (CRS), at point BB, 
Icafé can be sure that deducting minimum long run average processing costs results 
in farmers receiving no less than the value of marginal product (VMP):
26 
p*= MPC + VMP 
⇒ p* - MPC (=APCIcafé) = VMP 
Consequently, Icafé only permits the deduction of APCIcafé from the output price, 
received by a mill for their coffee. Mill/exporters cannot avoid this as it is done for 
them by Icafé: It is always the fixed, mill-specific APCIcafé  that is deducted from 
contract prices, p*. 
                                                 
25 The specific analysis of Stiegert et. al. relies on the assumption of a fixed proportional relation. 
While this is not an unreasonable assumption (it is commonly used in agricultural price analysis, 
although it is true that for those processed products with a high degree of substitutability between the 
farm and the marketing inputs, this assumption may not hold (Tomek and Robinson 1990). This is not 
the case for coffee: The farm input is the coffee cherry and the ‘marketing’ input is the milling process. 
Green coffee, the processed output, is essentially a de-pulped cherry. There are two beans to a cherry. 
No conceivable variation of a processing input could ever extract more than two beans from one 
cherry. Robinson and Tomek suggest that increasing labour as a marketing input may reduce wastage 
and introduce some degree of substitutability in some agricultural products, but there is very little 
scope for substitutability in Costa Rica’s sophisticated and highly mechanised milling process. There 
is, moreover, some evidence to support this argument: If there were an important degree of 
substitutability between the marketing (processing) input and coffee cherries, then we would expect to 
see a higher conversion ratio of coffee cherries to green beans in years of high prices. In fact, the 
correlation coefficient between the conversion factor of cherries to green coffee  and world price for 
the period 1974-2000 is statistically insignificant, despite historic price peaks for coffee during this 
period.), it is not central to the analysis here (see footnote 26).   
26This can be seen to hold simply through Euler’s Theorem. Euler’s Theorem states that if a function is 
homogeneous of degree 1 (e.g. at the point of constant returns to scale in a production function), then 
we can express it as the sum of its arguments weighted by their first partial derivatives (CEPA 
2004). In economics, the marginal productivity theory of distribution states that each factor of 
production is paid their marginal wage. If the assumption of CRS holds, then Euler’s Theorem implies 
that the total marginal cost of the factors of production exactly exhaust the output price. That is, that 
cherry inputs are paid their VMP at BB. In their discussion of market power, Steigert et. al. rely, rather, 
on the assumption of fixed proportions (presumably in the ratio prevailing at CRS) to indicate 
deviations from marginal cost pricing at any point along the long run average processing cost curve. 
The central propositions of the theoretical and empirical measure here described do not rely on the 
fixed proportions assumption; this was adopted only for the convenient expository framework offered 
by Figure 6. Nothing more than Euler’s theorem is evoked to develop the market power and mark-
down analysis in the paper. 
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Icafé, however, does not necessarily have p*, the true output price received by mills 
for their coffee. Rather, they have the contract price reported by the mill/exporter,
*
R p.  
As explained in the previous section, mills must register their output sales contracts 
with Icafé. The price reported on these contracts is 
*
R p . The mill-specific APCIcafé  is 
deducted from reported contract prices, to yield the mandatory producer prices  
published by Icafé. That is:   
*
R p - APCIcafé ≡ pp  
Rearranging,  
*
R p ≡ APCIcafé  + pp          ( 4 )
27 
If the mill reports the true output price, then 
p* - 
*
R p =   0             ( 5 )  
If, however,  
p* - 
*
R p >   0             ( 6 )  
and APC
Icafé is constant, then for the same p*, clearly the producer price that results 
from (6) is less than that which results from (5). Formally, 
Proposition 1: (p* - 
*
R p ) > 0 measures the margin that a mill/exporter has earned 





R p >   0             ( 6 )  
Substituting (4), this becomes 
p* - APCIcafé - pp  > 0 
this can be rewritten as  
p* - pp > APCIcafé  
and the mill/exporter has extracted a marketing margin greater than the minimum of 
their long run average processing cost.   
This establishes that the measure (p*-
*
R p ) > 0 is a measure of mill/exporter marketing 
margins greater than APC
Icafé. This is the first important result and links the intuitive 
exposition of Figure 6 to the empirical measure (p*-
*
R p ) used in the next section. 
                                                 
27 For a detailed exposition on the identity 
*
R p  ≡ APCIcafé + pp  , see the data description of  Icafé 
producer price calculations in Ronchi (2005).     28
It is always true that producer prices are highest if a firm extracts strictly the margin 
APC
Icafé. This is only, however, a measure of market power if the assumption of CRS 
is maintained. In that case, equations (4) and (6) together imply: 
Proposition 2: 
For as long as APC
Icafé= MPC  if  ( p*-
*




R p >   0             ( 6 )  
Substituting (4), this becomes 
p* - APC
Icafé(=MPC) - pp (= VMP) > 0 
If APC
Icafé  =MPC , then this is rewritten as  
p* - MPC - pp  > 0 
This can only be true if the output price has not exhausted the marginal value products 
of the inputs. Since the processing margin is exactly MPC, this implies that 
pp<VMP.  
Therefore, under the assumptions that  APC
Icafé = MPC,  the measure  (p*-
*
R p ) is a 
measure of market power as it measures deviations from marginal cost pricing. If the 
assumption of CRS were to be maintained for the analysis, then (p*-
*
R p)  a l w a y s  
uniquely measures market power.  
Maintaining the assumption of CRS, however, is unrealistically (and, it will be seen, 
unnecessarily) restrictive for Costa Rica. Interview data consistently indicated that 
mills struggle to obtain their ‘punto de equilibro’, their cost-minimizing scale due to 
the competition for cherries described in the previous section.  This is confirmed by a 
cost study of the Costa Rica milling sector over five years (1988-1993) , where it was 
estimated that only 31% of mills operate at the cost-minimizing point of their long run 
average cost curves, whilst 56% of mills in Costa Rica operate at a point like CC in 
Figure 6, on the IRS portion of their long run average processing cost curve 
(Mosheim 2002). Relaxing the assumption of CRS implies that the mill-specific 
variable (p*-
*
R p ) measures either its inefficiency, when this is measured by deviations 
from their cost-minimising point of operation (scale inefficiency), or market power, or 
both. Given this ambiguity, (p*-
*
R p ) will simply be called the ‘mark-down’ measure.  
The mark-down measure (p*-
*
R p ) can be understood simply as a variation of the 
familiar identification problem from the market power literature reviewed in Section 
III: Returning to Figure 6, consider a measure (p*-
*
R p ) that is equal to (c-b).
28 A 
measure equal to (c-b) either measures market power if the mill/exporter is operating 
                                                 
28 Recall that (p* -
*
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at BB, or it measures (scale) inefficiency if the mill is operating at CC.
29 (In both 
cases, however, the mill is able to extract a higher margin, to the detriment of the 
producer relative to the margin prevailing at the MES point). So, for example, 
modifying the figure that illustrated this critical issue of identification in Section IV, 
the identification difficulty inherent in (c-b) in Figure 6 can be seen in more familiar 
terms in Figure 7 below,
30 where the mark-down margins (p* -
*
R p ) (or (c-b)) must be 
inferred from observed producer prices on the y-axis : 













Suppose that input demand curve D1 belongs to a mill/exporter such as that operating 
at point CC in Figure 6. Let input demand curve D2 belong to a more efficient 
mill/exporter operating at point BB in Figure 6.  In this diagram, mill/exporters set 
profit maximizing prices at the intersection of their input demand curves (D1 or D2) 
and either the supply curve (in perfect competition) or along the marginal factor cost 
curve (if imperfectly competitive). If the mill/exporter is perfectly competitive, but 
inefficient (D1), it would operate at a point like B and the input price paid to farmers 
would be ppc1 (let the subscript ‘pc’ refer to perfectly competitive price and ‘M’ refer 
to the price that prevails with market power). If however, the mill/exporter were more 
efficient (D2), but exercised market power, it would operate at a point like A and the 
observed input price pM2 would be observationally indistinct from ppc1 (the observed 
margin,  (p* - 
*
R p ), however, is the same in both cases).  If on the other hand, mills 
were productively inefficient (D1) and exercising market power, they would operate at 
a point like C and pay an input price of pM1. The observed margin (p* -
*
R p ) in that 
case would be larger than if the firm were not exercising market power. Then again, 
                                                 
29 Steigert et. al. point out that if the firm is at CC due to an unexpected agricultural supply shock, say, 
then technically, the ensuing mark-down to recover costs is market power as the firm ‘sets the price’ 
(Stiegert, et al. 1993, p.550), thereby distinguishing this market power from a strictly usurious one. 
This is only strictly true under the fixed (CRS) proportions assumption maintained by the authors, 
whilst here, that assumption was maintained only for the expository purposes of using Figure 6. The 
present analysis does not depend on assumptions of CRS.    
30  The switch from the expository framework of Figure 6 to the more familiar one of  
Figure 7 is possible if it is assumed (for this exposition only) that all mills operate on the same long run 
APC, so that differences in efficiency, as represented by different demand curves in Figure 7 
correspond to scale efficiency as represented by different points on the APC curve in Figure 6.   30
input price pM1 could be observed for a perfectly competitive mill/exporter even more 
inefficient than that of D1 (D0) and so on.  
The institutional identification of market power 
It has been shown that deviations between p* and 
*
R p  measure a wedge between 
producer prices paid and the producer price prevailing at minimum efficiency scale 
(MES) under perfect competition. Under the restrictive assumption of constant returns 
to scale (CRS), where the mill/exporter is operating at MES, this wedge is a measure 
of pure market power, as defined as deviations from marginal cost pricing. Relaxing 
this assumption, it was shown that the measure (p* -
*
R p ) measures both market power 
and inefficiency. Unlike SCP analyses that did not uniquely identify market power 
and NEIO models that use structural estimates to identify market power, this paper 
will use features of the institutional reality in Costa Rica to distinguish between 
market power and efficiency in the mark-down measure (p* -
*
R p) .  
As seen in the brief market power NEIO literature review of Section IV, for (p* -
*
R p)  
to evidence strictly market power, it is essential to identify in Figure 7, on which 
demand and supply curves mills are operating. This is undertaken using Costa Rican 
specific institutional norms. The exercise of market power is evidenced by a price,    
pM < pPC, below the VMP (demand curve). This is easily observed in Figure 7, where 
the demand curves are laid out. The difficulty is, without knowing which 
mill/exporter is relatively more scale efficient (closer to the MES), the same measure 
(p* -
*
R p ) would indicate market power for the mill/exporter at point D or the relative 
scale inefficiency of the mill/exporter at point B.  
The analysis does not propose to formulate structural demand equations capable of 
distinguishing between these two outcomes, as in the NEIO. Instead, let the demand 
curve D1 belong to the least efficient mill/exporter.
31 The analysis proposes to 
institutionally identify point B, the perfectly competitive input market behavior for the 
least efficient firms: Let point B represent the point of operation of cooperative mills 
in Costa Rica. This is essentially a two-pronged claim: First, it claims that 
cooperatives are less scale efficient than other mills, i.e. on a lower demand curve. 
Second, it claims that cooperative mills do not exercise market power vis-à-vis 
farmers. If these two claims hold, then any (p* -
*
R p ) greater than that observed for 
cooperative mills (seen as a further mark-down in Figure 7 to a level such as pM1) is 
taken as evidence of market power in the input market for cherries in Costa Rica.  
Before providing support for these claims, note that the wider analysis of market 
failure for producers (and the role of Fairtrade therein), namely mill inefficiency and 
                                                 
31 Recall that conclusions about scale efficiencies are drawn from the relative positions of the demand 
curves in Figure 7 on the assumption that mills have the same long run average processing curve. This 
assumption was made for expository purposes, but is unnecessarily restrictive. It is also maintained 
here for the sake of exposition, although it is relaxed below .Note, furthermore, that it is theoretically 
possible that a mill be on a lower demand curve if it is more scale efficient than a cooperative, but on a 
higher long run average processing cost curve. As this is not a likely outcome, it is assumed throughout 
that non-cooperative mills are at least as cost efficient as cooperative mills. This is supported by cost 
studies of mills in Costa Rica (Mosheim 2002). In that case, the exposition of Figure 7 holds.   31
producer prices, do not depend on these claims, only the specific identification of 
market power (i.e. separation of efficiency from market power) does. 
That cooperatives are less (scale) efficient than other mills is not controversial. It has 
already been alluded to in Section V, where the liquidity constraints particular to 
cooperatives are binding in their ability to contract sufficient quantities of coffee early 
in the harvest. As was seen there, the extra services offered by cooperatives reduce the 
operating capital they might otherwise use as lucrative advance payments. In Costa 
Rica, the services offered by cooperatives can be extensive, including agro-technical 
advice, health services, community shops, etc. (for a fuller description of cooperative 
services, see Ronchi 2002a).  Non-cooperative mills have higher liquidity and 
therefore can afford to pay producers higher advance payments. These higher 
payments provide incentives to farmers to sell to the non-cooperative mill, either 
because their financial need is great at that moment or because they believe the 
ultimate harvest price will be higher (which, often, it is not). Furthermore, since the 
time of fieldwork for this paper, where this information about cooperatives was 
gathered through interviews, a cost study for Costa Rican mills explicitly evaluated 
the scale efficiency of cooperative mills vis-à-vis non-cooperative mills from 1988-
1993  and found that cooperative mills are, in fact,  less scale efficient than non-
cooperative mills (Mosheim 2002).  
The second claim, that cooperative mills operate on the supply curve and not the 
marginal factor cost curve, is the claim that cooperatives never exercise market 
power.  At some level, this is almost a tautology: Cooperatives are owned by 
members, so ‘the mill’ and ‘the farmer’ are conceptually indistinct. For the exercise of 
market power, collusion between the cooperative and exporter is required. The 
cooperative, at this level, cannot cheat itself. At a different level, this claim may be 
contested on the grounds that it is not the collective membership that enters into 
contract with the exporter, but the cooperative leader (manager). If there is corruption, 
cooperative margins (p* -
*
R p ) may well reflect market power. It is argued here, not 
that corruption never happens in Costa Rica, but that this outcome is unlikely to affect 
the empirical measures used in this paper.  During the course of six months spent on 
fieldwork in Costa Rica, actors from different parts of the industry attested to the high 
level of accountability in cooperatives. Tellingly, this testimony did not just come 
from cooperative leaders, who can be expected to claim this, but from farmers and 
from Icafé as well. In the first instance, farmers have memory of having deposed 
corrupt cooperative leaders. Such events were rare, but were scandalous and high 
profile. When undertaking interviews at Icafé while assembling the data set for this 
paper, the author made inquiries concerning cooperatives whose time series suddenly 
ceased or whose status changed to private hands. In the few occasions that this 
occurred, it was matter-of-factly communicated that the producers had fired the 
cooperative manager and dissolved the cooperative. This level of pro-activity is 
unsurprising knowing the solidarity history in Latin America. It is therefore not 
deemed problematic to maintain that cooperatives are unlikely to ‘cheat’ themselves. 
Furthermore, there is precedence of this treatment of cooperatives in the literature (see 
for example, Sexton 1990).  
While it is acknowledged that this identification procedure for market power is not 
universally applicable in all markets, in light of the disagreement surrounding the 
inference of market power from SCP, structural and nonparametric models, the   32
approach of Occam’s Razor 
32 is applied to the case of coffee in Costa Rica. Finding 
‘experiments in the data’ (Bresnahan 1982) that distinguish market power from 
efficiency effects in (p* -
*
R p ) has been the central issue in the empirical market power 
literature reviewed in Section IV. From a development perspective, however,  what is 
critical about a margin like (c-b) in Figure 6 is that it  measures a mark-down of 
producer prices other than that which would prevail if mills were operating at MES 
with no market power, and therefore imposes a cost on producers, so important to  the 
‘new’ commodity policy context. Although the econometric analysis of the following 
section does, in fact, use institutional norms in Costa Rica to distinguish between 
market power and inefficiency in (p* -
*
R p ), it will be seen that  (p* -
*
R p )  as a 
measure permits a broader assessment of the exact role of Fairtrade in the Costa Rican 
coffee sector.  The identification of market power through institutional norms in Costa 
Rica leads to three testable hypotheses. 
Testable hypotheses 
Testing the hypothesis of market power is undertaken by ascertaining the location of 
cooperative mills in the data relative to non cooperative mills. This provides the first 
stylized testable hypothesis for the analysis: 
i)  p(B) ≠ p(C),  which means that input price and therefore the margin         
(p* -
*
R p ) at point B is different from the margin at point C.  
Note that this hypothesis only informs on the presence of market power in the input 
market in Costa Rica for those mill/exporters with margins strictly larger than 
cooperative mills. That is: 
ii)  p(C) < p(B),  which means that the margin at point B is smaller than the 
margin at point C.   
This follows from the same identification issue discussed above: It is possible for a 
mill/exporter to have the same margin (p* -
*
R p ) (same pp in Figure 7) and to be 
operating on a more efficient demand curve, thereby exercising market power. Such a 
scenario is not identifiable by the procedure suggested. That is, it cannot identify 
every incidence of market power, rather, it informs strictly on the mere presence of 
any market power in Costa Rica’s coffee input market. A further limitation to this 
identification procedure concerns assessing the role of Fairtrade in overcoming a 
market failure in market power. Note that if it is maintained that cooperatives do not 
exercise market power, and all Fairtrade mills are cooperatives, then any empirical 
‘Fairtrade effect’ found does not inform on the effect of Fairtrade in overcoming a 
market failure in market power. Through the identification procedure described 
above, that is now true by assumption (that cooperatives do not exercise market 
power). Rather, any role of Fairtrade in overcoming market power must be assessed 
indirectly through the empirical identification and interpretation of a (non-
cooperative) ‘Fairtrade effect’ should one exist.  This is explicitly addressed in the 
interpretation of results in the next section. 
                                                 
32 “One should not increase, beyond what is necessary, the number of entities required to explain 
anything”.   33
As a result, the identification exercise proposed also permits the testing of a 
hypothesis about Fairtrade intervention. In the discussion on the data used in the 
following section, it is indicated that the Costa Rican price data used in the analysis 
does not include the famous Fairtrade premium floor price of US$1.26/lb. 
Furthermore, all Fairtrade mill/exporters are also cooperatives. If there is any 
Fairtrade ‘effect’ separate from the fact of simply being a cooperative,
33 then a 
different margin would be observable for Fairtrade mills. That is,  a Fairtrade ‘effect’ 
can be seen only if Fairtrade mills are operating on a relatively more efficient demand 
curve, somewhere to the right of D1. So, for example, in terms of Figure 7: 
iii)  p(D) > p(B)  which implies that the margin at point D is lower than the 
margin at point B 
This last hypothesis permits the empirical analysis of what are commonly treated as 
the ‘intangible’ effects of capacity building and non-price support of Fairtrade. In sum 
the stylized testable propositions (i) and (ii) can inform on the presence of market 
power in Costa Rica and (iii) informs on any Fairtrade ‘effect’ on the (cooperative) 
producers with which it intervenes.   
VII.  Empirical Analysis  
In the theoretical discussion above, it was seen that the variable (p* -
*
R p ) measures 
the mark-down of producer prices from the perfectly competitive MES level.  While a 
vast quantity of detailed data was mobilized to construct annual mill-specific (p* -
*
R p ), it is almost certainly simplistic to assume that it is measured entirely without 
error. For example, world price p* for Costa Rican will differ based on the destination 
market (e.g. US or EU). Since destinations of each contract for each mill cannot be 
known, average proportions are applied to each mill based on the national average 
proportions of coffee sent to the EU or the US. Any specific mill may, of course, 
export its coffee to the EU or the US in proportions that differ from the national 
average. In a fixed effects regression context, for example, the stable nature of these 
proportions (see Ronchi (2005) ) means that this potential source of error can be 
controlled for in the estimated fixed effect term; something that is not possible in 
deterministic, value-chain type measurements.
34  Furthermore, given that market 
power in particular is to be detected by analyzing variations in the data relative to a 
particular class of mills (cooperatives), it is of interest to move beyond a simple 
deterministic measure of ‘mark-down’ and into a regression context. The econometric 
analysis in this section estimates a reduced form equation to test for the presence of 
market power (hypotheses (i) and (ii) above) and for the presence of any ‘Fairtrade 
effect’ (hypothesis (iii) ). It also analyzes the possible determinants of any general 





                                                 
33 The non-price aspects of Fairtrade intervention were covered in Section II. 
34 Ronchi (2005) undertakes a detailed sensitivity analysis of the dependent and independent variables 
used in the data set for this exercise.    34
The dependent variable (p* -
*
R p)  
The variable (p* -
*
R p ) was constructed as an annual average for all mills individually 
(i.e. the measure (p* -
*
R p)   i s  mill-specific) over 26 years from 1974/75 to 1999/2000. 
Recall that p* is the perfectly competitive international benchmark price for different 
Costa Rican origins. It follows that individual mills will have individual annual 
average p* based on the composition of different origins (bean types) in their harvest.  
Mill-specific p* was therefore calculated using Icafé data on the proportions of 
different bean types in a mill’s harvest, and then applying the specific Costa Rican 
price series to the harvest for those bean grades. The price series were constructed 
from data collected from the ICO, the New York Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange 
(CSCE) where Arabica futures are traded, and using quality differentials obtained 
from private traders in Switzerland and London.
35  The variable 
*
R p , the annual 
average mill-specific price reported by mills to Icafé, was collected during six months 
of field work in Costa Rica with coffee producers, mills and the relevant staff at Icafé.  
This careful data work permitted the construction of a series of continuous mark-
down measures (p* -
*
R p ), which differ across mills and across years.  
Independent variables 
It has been seen that (p* -
*
R p ) indicates to what extent (if any) the market, through its 
structure, its actors and other factors, reduces the returns to the Costa Rican coffee 
producer from the perfectly competitive MES level.  In addition to locating 
cooperatives and Fairtrade mills in the data to test hypotheses (i) to (iii), any 
variations in the mark-down induced by market power can be understood in terms of 
simple rotations and shifts of the demand and supply curves (see Figure 7).  Shifts in 
demand represent movements along the supply curve. These affect the size of the 
deviation between pM and pPC (the size of the margin (p* -
*
R p ) when this is due to 
market power) since the wedge between supply and MPC differs along the supply 
curve. 
36  Input factor demand, D, is: 
VMP = p* x MPcherries , 
since Costa Rican coffee mills are not unreasonably assumed to be price takers in the 
output market. The demand shift factors that affect the VMP therefore include 
changes in the output price (world price for coffee, p*) and/or changes in their 
marginal product, including determinants of mill specific costs, such as bean types or 
changes in downstream technology.  
In addition to demand shift factors, the variation in the degree of exercise of market 
power across mills and across years may be affected by shifts in supply, for example, 
due to natural disasters or changes in farmer technology. Variation in the exercise of 
                                                 
35 For a detailed description of the data set construction used for the analysis, see Ronchi (2005). 

















clearly grows with Q.  
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market power can also be explained by factors that affect the degree of market power, 
or the elasticity of the supply curve facing the mill/exporter. Some commonly 
hypothesized factors affecting the steepness of the supply curve facing buyers include 
the amount of time required for supply reactions, which are obviously low for annual 
crop products like coffee, but are not perfectly inelastic: In response to incentives, 
output can be affected by the application of care to the crop, including fertilizer, 
weeding and pest control. Within the general context of low agricultural elasticities, 
other factors affecting the elasticity of supply include geography, the degree and 
quality of competition faced by mills/exporters and any market power conferred by 
variations in the quality of coffee beans processed.  
Further to the above factors affecting supply and demand, in a regulatory framework, 
the measure of market power (p* -
*
R p ) is clearly impacted by the efficacy of the 
regulatory body in enforcing the payment of the perfectly competitive price.  Factors 
that impede effective monitoring of registered prices will contribute to the market 
power source of variation in the measure. These include general political or economic 
instability and natural shocks such as hurricanes, floods and earthquakes. Unusual 
volatility in world prices and upheavals in world markets can also be potential factors. 
The ability for mills to by pass the checks and balances used by Icafé when a milling 
firm owns multiple plants is another potential obstacle to effective contract 
monitoring. Finally, the regulatory resources at the disposal of  Icafé will also impact 
the monitoring of registered contracts and their prices.  These potential determinants 
of market power and general mark-down behavior informed the body of explanatory 
variables used in the empirical analysis and collected during desk research and field 
work: 
Table 3 Variable List 
Variable Name  Variable Description 




R p) jt  The continuous mark-down measure for mill j in harvest year t 
zmcj  A dummy variable = if mill j is located in the Central Valley 
zcarj  A dummy variable = 1 if mill j is located in Cartago 
zturj  A dummy variable = 1 if mill j is located in Turrialba/Juan Viña/Orsi 
zatenj  A dummy variable = 1 if mill j is located in Atena/Palmares/Pursical 
zcotj  A dummy variable = 1 if mill j is located in Region Sur (Coto Brus) 
zsanj  A dummy variable = 1 if mill j is located in Los Santos 
zgenj  A dummy variable = 1 if mill j is located in San Isidro (El General) 
zguaj  A dummy variable = 1 if mill j is located in Guanacaste 
zsarj  A dummy variable = 1 if mill j is located in Sarapiqui 
ftjt  A dummy variable = 1 if mill j is a Fairtrade cooperative in harvest 
year t, 0 otherwise
37 
coopjt  A dummy variable = 1 if mill j is a cooperative in year t, 0 if the mill is 
not a cooperative 
ftcompjt  A dummy variable = 1 if mill j competes with a Fairtrade mill in t 
ownjt  A dummy variable = 1 if mill j is foreign owned in time t, 0 otherwise 
                                                 
37 Note that all Fairtrade mills are cooperatives. They are therefore all coded as cooperatives and then 
coded as Fairtrade mills to separate any ‘Fairtrade effect’ from a cooperative effect.   36
Variable Name  Variable Description 
multijt  A dummy variable = 1 if mill j owns more than one mill location in 
time t, 0 otherwise 
1974/75t to 
1999/2000t 
A series of dummy variables for each year between 1974/75 to 
1999/2000, taking the value of 1 if it is the year and 0 if not 
nyearsjt  A variable indicating the length of time (years) that mill j is in the 
sample at time t 
hbjt the  proportion  of  mill  j’s harvest accounted for by HB in t 
hbljt  the proportion of mill j’s harvest accounted for by HBL in t 
shbjt the  proportion  of  mill  j’s harvest accounted for by SHB in t 
 
Using a panel data set for the 157 mills that have been operational in Costa Rica over 
the 26 year period between 1974/75 and 1999/2000, the analysis of this paper 
attempts to identify the existence of mark-down behavior, market power, a ‘Fairtrade’ 
effect and to examine the determinants of any mark-down of producer prices 
observed. The panel is unbalanced as not all mills are present for each of the 26 years, 
although a full time series for many mills was possible due to fieldwork and 
interviews that tracked mills over time, even as they changed names.  
The model 
The explanatory variables listed in Table 3 are included in reduced form regression 
equation (7) below
38, estimated using a fixed effects formulation. The fixed effects 
model exploits the panel dimension of the data to control for any omitted factors in 
the model. Omitted factors may include the size of the mill, the degree of vertical 
integration with the exporter, the relationship of the mill with Icafé and any other mill 
characteristics on which the data to hand could not directly inform.
39  
                                                 
38 The model of (7) was built up from a basic ‘core’ model, augmented to include the effects of 
geography and those of time. Earlier specifications of the reduced form equation (7) also included 
variables for which data and proxies were either unavailable, of insufficient quality or suffered from 
collinearity. For example, there was insufficient data to measure the intensity of contract monitoring by 
Icafé. Collinearity of  inflation with time dummies led to inflation being dropped, etc.  
39 In addition to estimating (7) with a pooled OLS and a ‘between estimator’ formulation, a random 
effects model was also estimated, but considered inferior to the fixed effect formulation.  A priori, the 
usefulness of the random effects model is questionable since the ultimate choice of estimation 
procedure should rest upon the appropriateness of the model for the application at hand (Hsiao and Sun 
2000). In fact, there is reason to doubt the suitability of the random effects model in this application: In 
this analysis, the entire population of mills in Costa Rica is used, rather than a random sample drawn 
from a population of mills. It is therefore difficult to conceive, as one must in a random effects context, 
of omitted factors as randomly distributed across mills.  In addition to this theoretical objection, the 
random effects estimators were found to be inconsistent. The Breusch-Pagan for unbalanced panels and 
Hausman tests were conducted to determine the presence of random effects and their independence 
from the explanatory variables, respectively.  While the Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null of no 
random effects, the Hausman test informs on whether these random effects are independent of the 
explanatory variables. If they are not, then the random effects estimator is inconsistent and the model is 
misspecified.  The Hausman Test rejects the null of independence of the random effects from the 
explanatory variables for (7) at the five and 10% levels, although it does not reject it at the one percent 
level. The evidence for the independence of the omitted random effects from other explanatory 
variables is, at best, inconclusive and at worst, negative. As the independence assumption is essential 
for the consistency of estimated coefficients, the failure of the Hausman test to provide a robust result 
in favor of independence provides a compelling reason to believe that fitting a random effects model to 
the data results in misspecification.    37
(p* -
*
R p) jt = α j + β1hbljt + β2hbjt+ δ1ftjt + +δ2ftcompjt + δ3ownjt + δ4multijt + 
 δ5nyearsjt + γ11975/76j+…+ γ251999/2000jt + ejt       (7) 
 
The model of (7) uses harvest year dummies to control for variation over time.  The 
omitted category is 1974/75, so that the interpretation of time dummy variable 
coefficients is relative to this base year.   
The use of time dummies is found to be preferable to the ad-hoc inclusion of 
individual dummy variables for natural disasters, for weather, for policy changes, 
price spikes or for other time variant events.  This is because the potential sources of 
time-related variations are numerous, interrelated and complex.  For example, while 
the overall correlation between the mark-down measure (p* -
*
R p ) and world coffee 
prices in insignificant,
40 it is not unreasonable to think that dramatic price spikes and 
natural disasters  can affect the mark-down measure.  In Figure 8, there are three years 
in which the international market exhibited modest to major price spikes, largely due 
to adverse climatic conditions. The spike in 1976/77, for example, was caused by the 
(southern hemisphere) winter frost in Brazil, and those of 1985/86 and 1994/95 were 
due to a drought in Brazil in 1985/86 with minor frosts and low rainfall in Central 
America in both 1985/86 and 1994/95 (Gilbert 1995).   
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In addition to generalized price responses to adverse climatic conditions, variations 
observed in either or both series in Figure 8 can be due to changes in national or 
international policy. For example, the introduction of a binding coffee ICA in the 
1982/83 harvest or its final suspension in 1989 might have an effect on mark-down 
behavior. So might the natural disaster history of Costa Rica, Central America and the 
                                                 
40 The Pearson correlation coefficient, rxy = 0.18 with a t-stat of 0.84.   38
Caribbean found in Table 4 and Table 5, important in understanding the role of supply 
shocks in these years: 
 Table 4 Natural Disaster Profile for Costa Rica 
Date Disaster  Population  Impact 
February 1976  Volcano  70,000 affected 
April 1983  Earthquake  10 killed
October 1988  Hurricane Joan  127,500 affected; 28 killed
April 1991  Earthquake  51killed, 19700 affected
August 1991  Flood  185,021 affected
November 1993  Flood  38,451 killed
February1996  Flood  20,000 affected
July 1996  Hurricane Cesar  Affected 500,000; 51 killed
October 1996  Wind Storm  216,000 affected
October 1998  Hurricane Mitch  16,700 affected, 4 killed
Source: (CRED 2004;ECLAC and IBD 2000); author’s own work 
Table 5 Natural Disaster Profile for Central America and the Caribbean 
Date Country  Disaster 
1976 Guatemala  Earthquake 
1978 Honduras,  Belize  Hurricane  Greta 
1979 Dominica  Hurricane  David 
1979 Dominican  Republic  Hurricanes David/Frederic 
1980 Haiti  Hurricane  Allen 
1982 Nicaragua  Hurricane  Alleta 
1986 El  Salvador  Earthquake 
1987  Dominican Republic  Hurricane Emily 
1988 Jamaica  Hurricane  Gilbert 
1988 Nicaragua  Hurricane  Joan 
1989 Antigua/Guadalupe  Hurricane  Hugo 
1991 Costa  Rica  Earthquake 
1992 Nicaragua  Tsunami 
1993  Nicaragua, Honduras  Tropical Storm Gert 
1995 Nicaragua Heavy  Rains 
1996  Costa Rica, Nicaragua  Hurricane Cesar 
1996  Nicaragua  Eruption Maderas Volcano 
1998  Dominican Republic, Haiti Hurricane  George 
1998  Honduras, Nicaragua,  
Costa Rica 
Hurricane Mitch 
Source: (Martine 1999) 
Any of these factors, and any which might be omitted, can be related to variations in 
the mark-down measure and to the potential exercise of market power. For example,  
mills/exporters, in non-spike years, may be less tempted to deflate 
*
R p  with a 
deliberate ‘cheating’ factor since Icafé, in theory, investigates any contract price that 
is suspiciously deviant  from the international p*. In interviews there seems to be an 
awareness of a lower limit below which suppressing the reported 
*
R p  is likely to be 
detected (see also Garro 2000). In times of extreme price movement, however, Icafé 
will not have full information on p* and will have greater difficulty in monitoring 
*
R p . 
More generally, upheavals in the world market, including the suspension of coffee   39
ICAs in 1988/89 or natural disasters, makes it difficult for Icafé to compare reported 
prices to an international benchmark and mills/exporters may add an extra deviation 
to their imperfectly competitive input price with less fear of detection. The 
plausibility of this information failure at Icafé is supported in interviews of key 
informants in Costa Rica, who consistently hinted at the limitations of contract price 
monitoring at Icafé.  
Whereas unpicking the time effects may be an issue of separate interest, the data 
requirements to do so in a rigorous fashion are heavy.  While data are clearly 
available on natural disasters, production and ICA policy variables, if these do not 
account for the whole of the variation observed over time in the Costa Rican data, a 
clean interpretation of their estimated coefficients is rendered difficult. Second, if they 
do not account for the whole of the variation observed over time, then they do not 
even serve the primary objective of controlling effectively for time to estimate clean 
Fairtrade and cooperative effects necessary for the identification of market power and 
‘Fairtrade effects’.  
Estimating time-invariant factors 
Fixed effects estimators are also called ‘within’ estimators because it transforms the 
data into deviations from its mean over time. As such, time-invariant variables drop 
out of a fixed effects regression. This includes time-invariant mill characteristics such 
as geographical location and cooperative status. 
41 The explanatory value of time 
invariant variables must be explored in a second stage weighted least squares (WLS) 
regression model (8): 
∧
j fe  = α+ δ1coopj + φ1zcarj + φ2zturj + φ3atenj + φ4cotj + φ5sanj + φ6zgenj + φ7guaj  
+ φ8sarj + ej           (8)  
                                                 
41  With the exception of two out of 26 cooperative mills, cooperatives in Costa Rica did not change 
their cooperative status in the time period under analysis. The estimation of a coefficient for the 
cooperative dummy variable (coop) in (7) would therefore be driven entirely by the two cooperatives 
that did change status in the data set. It would be difficult to generalize about cooperatives based on 
two observations. If, however, the two mills are dropped from the sample, then the remaining 
cooperatives are all time invariant and their explanatory effect can only be examined in a second stage 
equation, along with the geographic variables. To ensure the results are not sensitive to the removal of 
the two status-changing cooperatives, the full model (7) was re-estimated, this time including the two 
cooperatives in the data set. No difference in size or significance of the independent variables was 
found.  This satisfies any concern that estimates of (7) are sensitive to the presence or removal of these 
two mills. Their removal does permit a ‘clean’ estimation of cooperative effects with the other time 
invariant (geographic) explanatory variables in a second stage weighted least squares regression (8).  
Although the inability of a fixed effects model to estimate time invariant coefficients in a first stage is 
often cited as a drawback of the procedure, it is not sensible to force that first stage estimation of the 
cooperative variable on the strength of two potentially anomalous observations.   40




42 become the dependent variable and the cooperative and geographic dummy 
coefficients serve as explanatory variables. Note that the Central Valley is the omitted 
category so that the interpretation of geographic dummy variable coefficients is 
relative to the Central Valley region. 
Econometric Results 
Estimating (7) using the panel data set on the Costa Rican coffee market yields the 
following results: 
Table 6 Fixed Effects Estimates for (7) 












































                                                 
42 The mill-specific fixed effects are recovered from the data by  β ˆ
j x j y j α ˆ − =  where yj is the 
dependent variable and β ˆ is the vector of estimated coefficients. STATA, however, calculates the fixed 
effects as  β ˆ
j x α j y j α ˆ − − = , where α  is the overall constant term for the regression (the average 
value of all fixed effects). Programming with matrices within STATA does, however, permit the 
estimation of correct mill fixed effects ( β ˆ
j x j y j α ˆ − = ) ‘by hand’, as it were. All mill specific fixed 
effects referred to in the thesis are calculated this way and double checked against STATA estimates. 
This also permits the calculation of a full set of variances for the fixed effects (not possible with an 
unbalanced data set in STATA) with which to perform a WLS in the second stage regression.  
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(between) 0.358  R
2 
  (overall) 0.684 
std. error regress.  [19.94] 
White’s Test for 
Heteroskedasticity 
χ
2(42) = 349.60 
Prob >χ
2 = 0.00 
F-tests  F(32,2188) = 235.87 
Ramsey Reset Test 
(3,2221) = 3.49 
Prob > F = 0.02 
Robust standard errors in brackets
43 
*significant at 10% ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
                                                 
43 The F-test performed in a regression with White corrected variance-covariance matrix is actually a 
Wald test.  The econometric package used (STATA), however, converts the Wald value to an F-test 
value, which it then reports, as in Table 6 above.   42
The fixed effects estimators explain 68% of the overall variation in the mark-down 
measure across mills and over time.  Controlling for mill-specific effects, the model 
also explains some 35% of the variation in market power measures between mills and 
78% of the variation within mills.
44  The fixed effects specification does not reject the 
null of no omitted variables. The presence of heteroskedasticity is confirmed. This 
latter problem is overcome by reporting robust standard errors for the fixed effects 
model’s estimated coefficients in Table 6. 
The proportion of low quality bean (hbl) in the harvest is insignificant, while the 
proportion of high quality bean (shb) has the (anticipated) negative sign, significant at 
10%. That is, on average and ceteris paribus, a one percentage point increase in the 
proportion of SHB in a mill’s harvest leads to a fall in the mark-down measure by 
0.07 US cents/kg.  The estimated coefficient for the Fairtrade competition dummy is 
not significant.  The estimated coefficient for foreign ownership is negative and 
significant in (7): A mill that is foreign owned records, on average and ceteris 
paribus, mark-down measures over 19 US cents/kg lower than domestically owned 
mills.  The coefficient for multiplant ownership is significant and positive, albeit at 
the 10% level only: Those mills with more than one plant have almost 11 US cents/kg 
higher mark-down measures than those who do not have more than one plant. The 
coefficient for the age of the mill in the sample (nyears) is also significant at the 10% 
level in (7), such that for every year longer a mill is in the sample, holding all else 
equal, the market failure measure falls by 0.42 US cents/kg.   
Most time dummy coefficients are significant, but can only partly be explained by the 
policy, weather and  natural disasters discussed above.  For example, the historic price 
spike years of 1976/77 and 1994/95 have the anticipated significant positive 
coefficients, a result commensurate with the idea of market power being exercised 
with greater ease in times of unusual volatility. On average, mills in 1976/77 record 
mark-down measures some 67 US cents/kg higher than in the base year and mills in 
1994/95 record mark-down measures 64 US cents/kg higher than mills in the base 
year. When compared to the size of the price spike over the price level of the base 
year (377 US cents/kg and 269 US cents/kg), the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients is entirely plausible.
45  While some time dummy coefficients have signs 
and significance that can be understood in terms of what is known about those years, 
this is not universally true:  Despite the fall in prices at the collapse of the ICA in 
1989, the coefficient for that harvest year is still significantly positive.  This suggests 
that the use of time dummies to clean up the estimation and interpretation of the other 
explanatory variables may be preferable than trying to capture each and every time-
variant factor as individual variables. 
Of the seven (non-time dummy) explanatory variables included in model (7), only 
two (hbl and ftcomp) are poorly determined.  Based on the stated objective of the 
Fairtrade movement to mitigate ‘cheating’ of farmers by middlemen, helping in their 
                                                 
44 The fixed effects estimators hold stronger explanatory power than the between model and 
comparable, if not superior, explanatory power to the pooled OLS estimators of (7), when the within 
variation is taken into account.  
45 Note that the dummy variable for 1981/82 has been dropped by the estimation software. This is most 
likely due to collinearity with the inflation rate, which soared to 92% in Costa Rica in 1981/82. This 
issue is returned to below.   43
efficient organization, and its ideological preference for cooperatives as a vehicle for 
this intervention,  it is not unreasonable to anticipate that the dependent variable have 
a negative relationship with Fairtrade participation.
46  In fact, the Fairtrade coefficient 
in (7) is significant: Fairtrade mills record mark-down measures that are almost six 
US cents/kg lower than non-Fairtrade mills. 
The included regressors explain 68% of the overall variation in the mark-down 
measure. Some 41% of the variance in the model of (7), however, is due to the mill-
specific ‘fixed effects’ constant terms (αj).  A closer analysis of these fixed effects is 
therefore desirable. This analysis is ideally performed using a weighted least squares 
(WLS) procedure in which less weight is  given to those fixed effects that are less 
precisely estimated (Saxonhouse 1977).  In a second stage WLS regression, the (155) 
estimated mill-specific fixed effects from the fixed effects regression become the 
dependent variable and the cooperative and geographic dummy coefficients serve as 
explanatory variables. The mill-specific fixed effects and their variances were 
recovered from STATA (see footnote 42). Estimating (8) using the weighted least 
squares (WLS) procedure reveals that the cooperative status and geographic location 
of mills explains over 40% of the variation in estimated fixed effects across mills.  
                                                 
46 This may potentially raise an endogeneity issue in the model if Fairtrade status is a function of 
market power exercise or if Fairtrade targets the weakest mills.  Econometrically, testing and correcting 
for this requires instruments that are not available in the data at hand, however, the stated belief of the 
Fairtrade movement that the ‘exploitation’ of farmers is a general phenomena somewhat attenuates this 
concern.  In fact, similar exercises recently conducted that explicitly control for possible endogeneity 
bias, also find that prices received by farmers are higher (or less marked down) in specialty markets 
like Fairtrade (see Wollni (2006)).  
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White’s Test for Heteroskedasticity 
χ
2(9) = 3.10  
Prob >χ
2 = 0.93  
F-test  F(9,145) = 10.76 
Ramsey Reset Test 
F(3,142 ) =0.02  
Prob > F = 0.99 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
*significant at 10% ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The included regressors explain almost half of the variation in mill-specific fixed 
effects and almost every explanatory variable in the model of (8) is well-determined.
47 
The estimated coefficient for the cooperative status dummy is significantly negative: 
On average and ceteris paribus, cooperative mills record fixed effect mark-down  
measures over 13 US cents/kg lower than non-cooperative mills. Note that the omitted 
category is all non-cooperative mills, including foreign-owned mills that were seen to 
have smaller mark-down measures than the omitted category of domestic owned, non-
cooperative mills. Even with the presence of these mills in the omitted category of (8), 
the coefficient on cooperative mills is negatively significant. Mill-specific fixed 
effects represent the omitted characteristics of the mills that are discernable thanks to 
the panel dimension of the model. The negative coefficient on the cooperative dummy 
variable confirms that there is something structural about cooperative mills that lead 
them to have very low mark-down measures relative to the fixed effects of all other 
mills.  
                                                 
47 Note that the standard diagnostic tests (White’s Test, F-test, Ramsey Reset Test) reported in earlier 
tables are also included in Table 7, but the distribution of the diagnostic tests in a WLS framework is 
not known, so the interpretation of such should be treated with caution. Note also that the reported R
2 is 
here calculated as the squared correlation coefficient between the actual and predicted values, using the 
original un-weighted data and WLS coefficient estimates.   45
Returning to Table 7, the regions of Coto Brus (zcot), San Isidro/El General (zgen), 
and Sarapiqui (zsar) (see Figure 4 for a map of the regions) all have significantly 
positive coefficients implying that mills located in these more remote regions do 
indeed record mill-specific mark-down measures that are 17, 20 and 32 US cents/kg 
greater than mills in the Central Valley, respectively. The same is true for Cartago 
(zcar) and Turrialba (ztur). Apart from Cartago, where mills located there record fixed 
effect mark-down measures over 15 US cents/kg higher, the regions adjacent to the 
Central Valley have coefficients that are insignificant, implying that their mill specific 
mark-down measures are not statistically different from mills in the Central Valley. 
This is also true for the most remote coffee growing region, Guanacaste, where 
Fairtrade intervention is concentrated. The estimated coefficient for the Guanacaste 
regional dummy (zgua) is not significantly different from zero implying mills located 
there do not have mill specific fixed effect measures of market failure significantly 
different from those of the Central Valley, despite its isolation and monopsonistic 
potential. It may be tempting to see this as a ‘Fairtrade effect’, as six of the 10 mills 
located in Guanacaste became Fairtrade mills. Recall, however, that Fairtrade effects 
are already controlled for in the estimated fixed effects from the first stage equation of 
Table 6.  It is therefore unsurprising that, when calculated for the period before and 
after Fairtrade intervention, the mill specific fixed effects for the Guanacaste mills as 
a group are not statistically different pre and post Fairtrade.
48 A more likely 
explanation of the poorly determined Guanacaste coefficient is a correlation with the 
cooperative dummy: Six out of 10 Guanacaste mills are (Fairtrade) cooperatives.    
Summary of empirical results 
In demeaning the data, the fixed effects formulation eliminates the geographic and 
cooperative dummies, making a second stage WLS regression necessary to retrieve 
these effects. The overall picture that emerges is that vertically integrated  foreign 
owned firms (own), Fairtrade mills (ft) and cooperative mills (coop) all have the 
effect of lowering the mark-down measure for mills, to the tune of 5 to 20 US 
cents/kg. A similar, but smaller impact is true for the proportion of SHB in the harvest 
and the age of the mill in the sample.  Milling firms with multiple mills across the 
country record higher mark-down measures than their counterparts and, with the 
exception of Guanacaste, more remote mills record higher mark-down measures than 
those of the Central Valley.    
A starting point to the policy consequences to be drawn from the empirical analysis 
above, lies in the testing the stylized hypotheses introduced in Section VI. First, 
stylized hypotheses (i) and (ii) imply that  non-cooperative mills with mark-down 
measures greater  than cooperative mills (or, conversely, smaller mark-down 
                                                 
48 The t-statistic for the difference between two means upholds the null of no differences in average 
fixed effects for Guanacaste mills at -0.15. More complete tests, such as the Chow Test, for separability 
are not conducted for two key reasons: First, the null of non sample separation of the data could not be 
consistently rejected in earlier estimations. Second, in addition to the fact that the simple Chow test for 
separability is inappropriate for variance component models like the fixed effects models, separating 
the data along Fairtrade lines, for example, would render the Fairtrade policy variables time invariant in 
the post-Fairtrade period and would not be estimated by the fixed effects model in any event.  
   46
measures for cooperative mills) evidence the exercise of market power. Formally, this 
is equivalent to a test of: 
Hypothesis Test 1 
H0:  coop
∧
β = 0 
Ha:  coop
∧
β < 0 
From Table 7, it can be seen that the estimated coefficient  coop
∧
β , is statistically 
significantly less than zero.
49 That is, the null hypothesis that cooperative and non-
cooperative mills have the same mark down measure is robustly rejected in favor of 
the alternative that on average and ceteris paribus, cooperative mills have lower 
mark-down measures than non-cooperative mills.  According to the institutional 
framework for identifying market failure explained in Section VI, this is taken as 
evidence that despite the best efforts of Icafé and Law 2762, market power is 
exercised by some mills in Costa Rica. 
The second key result refers to the stylized hypothesis about a Fairtrade efficiency 
effect. The estimated coefficient for the Fairtrade status dummy variable is significant 
in (7).
50  Recall that all Fairtrade mills are also cooperatives. Since the cooperative 
dummy is not in the first stage fixed effect, the interpretation of the fixed effects 
estimator for Fairtrade is that, on average and ceteris paribus, Fairtrade mills record 
mark-down measures that are almost six US cents/kg lower
51 than non Fairtrade, non-
foreign owned, single plant mills, including other cooperatives.  If is maintained that 
cooperatives do not exercise market power, then a separate Fairtrade effect has an 
efficiency interpretation. This is returned to below. Finally, it is notable that only once 
a number of unknown mill characteristics are controlled for in the fixed effects 
formulation is the Fairtrade effect discernable (see footnote 50). This result is 
intuitive—there is a lot of mill-specific information that is simply unknown, including 
proportions of zoned coffee, exact destination markets, access to niche markets, 
proportion of unripe coffee, role of other NGOs and other interventions, etc. It is for 
this reason that the fixed effects formulation is so very useful: Claims of the benefits 
of Fairtrade are notoriously difficult to attribute to Fairtrade in commodity markets 
with many actors and many factors (Ronchi 2002b), many of which are unknown. 
Controlling for them is the only way to isolate a Fairtrade effect. 
                                                 
49 This result is robust across all version of (7) and (8) estimated using pooled OLS, between and fixed 
effect estimators (see Ronchi (2005) for a complete set of results). 
50 This result is only true only once mill-specific fixed effects are controlled for in the fixed effects 
formulation of (7). Pooled OLS and between estimators for the Fairtrade coefficient (see Ronchi (2005) 
) are not significant.  
51 It is important to recall that this fall in the mark-down measure is not due to the oft-superior Fairtrade 
price (US $1.26/lb) as the data for 
*
R p  in (p* - 
*
R p ) do not include the Fairtrade premium. Any effect 
must be attributable to the other Fairtrade effects such as capacity building, export technical assistance, 
organizational support, liquidity, credit, etc.  
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There is a third result from the econometric analysis of the chapter that may be 
important for policy, both generally and in characterizing the role of Fairtrade in 
terms of an ‘efficiency effect’.  This has to do with the robust and consistently 
negative estimated coefficient for the foreign-ownership dummy. In the fixed effects 
estimation of (7), on average and ceteris paribus, foreign owned mills record mark-
down margins that are almost 20 US cents/kg lower than domestically owned, single-
plant, non-Fairtrade mills. Without knowing (or estimating) the input demand curve 
for foreign owned firms, it is impossible to conclude that foreign-owned 
mill/exporters are not exercising market power, but it is clear that producers receive 
lower mark-downs from these firms than from the control group described. It is not 
inconceivable that much of this can be attributed to the superior efficiency of these 
firms. This is interesting because it contradicts the oft-made conclusion in value chain 
analyses of coffee that multinationals are responsible for the shrinking shares and 
falling returns of coffee farmers. Furthermore, the Fairtrade effect can be 
contextualized with respect to this result and that of the estimated coefficient of 
cooperatives. Specifically, if the estimated coefficient on cooperatives is seen as the 
‘no market power effect’ then one way to understand the role of Fairtrade as a 
development policy is to test whether the ‘Fairtrade effect’ is one of bringing levels of 
efficiency for cooperatives only enjoyed in this analysis by vertically-integrated 
foreign owned mills. Consider the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 
H0:  coop ft β + β - own β = 0 
Ha:  coop ft β + β   own β ≠ 0 
The relevant F-test is F(1,2221) = 0.11 and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. It 
would appear that the effect of Fairtrade on cooperatives is exactly equivalent to the 
effect of vertical integration and foreign ownership on domestically-owned non-
cooperatives.  
VIII.  Policy Consequences  
The interface of Fairtrade NGO activities with other policy making spheres makes the 
assessment of the role of Fairtrade in overcoming the market factors limiting producer 
returns in internationally traded commodities like coffee, an informative one. Using 
an original data series collected from fieldwork, the paper assesses the market power 
justification and wider Fairtrade effect of Fairtrade intervention in the Costa Rican 
input market for coffee cherries. This assessment takes place in the context of the 
information theoretic approach to development, which places the underlying causes of 
the observed crisis facing producers at the heart of corrective policy. Having 
identified market power and a lack of capacity with producer organizations at the 
heart of the low share of producers in coffee prices, Fairtrade is therefore assessed by 
establishing the extent to which these underlying problems are seen to exist in Costa 
Rica and to measure the effect of Fairtrade in overcoming these. The econometric 
results of this assessment also imply policy consequences for the Costa Rican 
government and similar initiatives, as well as informing on the potential effectiveness 
of the international donor group commodity policies. This section discusses the 
implication of the empirical results with these three areas of policy.   48
Policy Implications for Costa Rica  
The data work briefly described above permitted the construction of a series of 
continuous variables, (p* -
*
R p ), that measure the mark-down of producer prices from 
the level that prevails at the point where average processing costs are minimized in 
perfect competition. As such, the measure potentially informs on both scale 
inefficiency and market power. In maintaining the not unreasonable assumptions that 
cooperatives do not exercise market power, are strictly more scale inefficient and at 
least as (productively) inefficient as non-cooperative firms, the existence of any 
mill/exporters with mark-down measures higher than those of cooperatives is taken as 
evidence of market power. The results of the previous section indicate that 
cooperative mills do in fact have robustly statistically significant lower mark-down 
measures than domestically owned, non-cooperative, single-plant mills. In other 
words, that despite legislative best efforts, it appears that mill/exporters in Costa Rica 
can still exercise market power.  
One of the contributions of the analysis, then, is to reveal the existence of a group of 
mills that are able to mark producer prices down below levels that can be explained 
by scale inefficiency and cost recovery.  This is not to say that mill mark-down 
behavior conducted in order to recover costs is not detrimental to producers. Rather, 
in the first instance, it justifies the preoccupation of both national legislation and 
Fairtrade intervention with mill market power. This identification of market power 
using cooperative mills is necessary to evaluate the performance of government and 
the intervention of Fairtrade in this respect.  The market power identification 
procedure used in this paper does not permit the identification of every incidence of 
market power (for example, it is entirely feasible that there are mills of superior 
efficiency whose market power margin is less than the relative inefficiency of 
cooperatives and therefore not identifiable in the analysis), but only that it generally 
exists among at least one specific group of mills, on average and ceteris paribus. As 
such, the results cannot guide Icafé in mill-targeted corrective measures; it can only 
indicate the broad mill characteristics that appear conducive to the exercise of market 
power.  The robustly significant time dummy coefficients also provide a clue as to the 
factors that contribute to mark-down behavior. Specifically, the higher mark-downs 
that occur in times of upheaval (e.g. price spike years) indicate that at the heart of the 
‘government failure’ to mitigate market power, may lie information.  
It has been asserted that observed mark-downs might also occur as firms attempt to 
recover costs which are above the level prevailing at MES. Regardless of the reasons 
that mill/exporters may mark down producer prices, the mechanism by which they do 
so, by registering low valued contracts, indicates that whilst the market power 
motivation behind the original design of Law 2762 was justified, the reasons for that 
market power were not addressed. It has been seen that over the period of study Icafé 
simply does not have the resources or information to monitor contract prices for 
authenticity, in the exact same way that fieldwork with farmers indicated that they did 
not have the market information to monitor the prices their harvest was being sold for. 
In some way, the primal role of information was recognized, only recently, by Icafé 
with the development of new, more sophisticated, monitoring tools based on up-to-
date market information. Finally, in promoting foreign direct investment in the coffee 
sector and exercising a comparatively light touch in commodity regulation, Costa 
Rica has got it right: The econometric analysis indicates that multinational   49
mill/exporters have mark-down measures, on average and ceteris paribus, some 20 
US cents/kg lower than the control group of domestically owned, single plant non-
cooperative firms. 
The Costa Rican regulatory system is costly in its reliance on annual studies and 
extensive contract registration and producer price calculation procedures. It could be 
argued that if information is essentially at the heart of the exercise of market power 
and the mark-down of producer prices, then perhaps legislative resources are better 
spent in providing greater market information to producers and promoting their 
mobility for harvest sales. On the other hand, the paper does not (and cannot) inform 
on producer price mark-down behavior in the absence of Law 2762 altogether. What 
is certain is that, whether to check market power or to prevent the subsidization of 
inefficient mills by producers, better contract price information to limit the mark-
down on producers would improve the effectiveness of Costa Rica’s coffee policy.  
Policy Implications for Fairtrade 
What is the role of Fairtrade in overcoming the market factors limiting producer 
returns in internationally traded commodities like coffee? The results of the previous 
section inform on the key research question in two important ways: First, until now, in 
the absence of empirical evidence, it has been difficult to assess, on non-ideological 
grounds, the effectiveness of Fairtrade support for cooperatives.  Using the 
information theoretic approach as a starting point, Fairtrade support for cooperatives 
as a policy is effective only if doing so corrects for the underlying causes of the 
problem of low shares for producers in commodity markets. Specifically, Fairtrade 
intervention with cooperatives in the coffee market is partly aimed to mitigate market 
power. Since it is argued above that, by definition, cooperatives do not exercise 
market power, the only way to assess the Fairtrade role in mitigating market power is 
to ascertain if there is any evidence that market power exists at all. If there is no 
evidence for market power in the market, then (unless it is maintained that Fairtrade 
corrected for market power in the national market as a whole) this conclusion could 
not be drawn. The provision of qualified evidence for the exercise of market power in 
Costa Rica justifies the Fairtrade intervention on the grounds of market power. Since 
a Fairtrade mill is by definition a cooperative mill, and it is relative to cooperatives 
that market power has been identified, a stronger statement may be tautological.  
What is clear is that smallholder coffee farmers face market power at the farm-gate, 
even in socially protective Costa Rica.  It is this that permits a generalization of the 
results to commodity producers in countries with weaker (cooperative and legislative) 
contexts than Costa Rica. The extent to which cooperatives are operating accountably 
(and in countries with a weaker solidarity context, this is partly endogenous to 
Fairtrade efforts) determines the extent to which Fairtrade is effective in tackling one 
of the problems underlying poor returns for producers.  
The second important result concerns the identification of a statistically significant 
‘Fairtrade effect’, separate from the cooperative effect. The fixed effects coefficient 
for Fairtrade mills estimated provides evidence that, ceteris paribus and on average, 
the mark-downs associated with Fairtrade mills are smaller than those of 
domestically-owned, single-plant mills, including other cooperatives. That is, there is 
a separate Fairtrade effect. On the maintained assumption that cooperatives cannot 
cheat themselves, and Fairtrade mills are cooperatives, one interpretation of this result 
is that Fairtrade support for cooperatives in Costa Rica results in an improvement in   50
their (scale) efficiency that reduces the mark-downs of producer prices. For example, 
one of the main determinants of scale efficiency in Costa Rica is the early assurance 
of a sufficient harvest from producers. Although the Fairtrade premium was not 
included in the price series used for the analysis, the retention of a portion of that 
premium by Coocafé and its member cooperatives (see Section V) may provide the 
liquidity other cooperatives desperately need to secure volumes. Similarly, the social 
and welfare projects initiated and supported by Fairtrade cooperatives may command 
loyalty from producers that other cooperatives cannot. What is apparent is that 
producers organized in Fairtrade cooperatives face lower mark-downs to their prices 
than domestically owned, single-plant mills of both cooperative and non-cooperative 
structure.  
Commodity Policy Implications 
The policy implications for Costa Rica and for the Fairtrade movement also inform on 
the ‘new’ commodity policy for coffee described in Section III in four key ways. 
First, it is clear that policies aimed at improving the premiums earned by producers 
are only effective to the extent to which those premiums are passed on.  Second, the 
evidence of mark-downs from the level of producer prices that would exist if all 
mill/exporters were operating at their minimum efficiency scales supports the new 
policy emphasis on efficiency and reducing costs.  It is important to note however, 
that the evidence in Costa Rica indicates that it is not necessarily farmers that are the 
inefficient agents.  Third, the existence of a separate ‘Fairtrade effect’ indicates that it 
is, in fact, possible to develop relatively efficient and organized producer groups. 
This, it will be recalled, was one of the main challenges and critiques of the new 
commodity policy. For example, how to deliver market-based price risk mitigation 
tools to disparate small producers.  The result from the previous section that the 
combined cooperative and Fairtrade effects is statistically equivalent to the 
multinational effect can be interpreted that Fairtrade does for cooperatives what 
multinationals do for non-cooperatives. In this sense, Fairtrade has potentially an 
important role in the new commodity policy context and its search for ‘delivery 
vehicles’ for its policy tools. Finally, the result concerning the superior returns, ceteris 
paribus, accruing to producers who sell to vertically integrated multinational firms in 
Costa Rica lends support to the new policy emphasis on partnerships (…achieving 
quality based competitiveness takes time. This process is greatly aided by partnerships 
and match making arrangements with the private sector (including foreign firms)..” 
(Varangis, et al. 2003c, p.45). Furthermore, the sizeable and significant coefficient on 
multinational mill/exporters in Costa Rica indicate that contrary to the policy advice 
emanating from the value chain literature, vertical integration of highly concentrated 
trading firms into processing in Costa Rica has in fact increased the returns accruing 
to coffee producers.   
 
IX.  Conclusion and Future Directions for Research 
Falling and volatile real prices for coffee entail a crisis of development for fully one-  
quarter of the world’s agricultural commodity producers. The global causes for the 
most recent crisis in coffee include permanent structural changes to supply and 
demand. With the demise of international price support arrangements, this has led 
coffee commodity policy in new directions. Specifically, it has been seen that policy   51
has come to focus less on trying to ‘fix’ low and volatile prices, and more on enabling 
producers to increase their share of existing returns and to cope with the volatility. In 
addition to developing safety nets and promoting diversification out of coffee, 
therefore, policy prescriptions emanating from the multilateral donors and major 
industry bodies rely on market risk management tools. They also aim to increase the 
returns to producers through a reduction in their costs and an increase in their access 
to premium markets.  
The Fairtrade movement also recognizes a number of factors that reduce the returns to 
producers and bases its justification for intervention in commodity markets on these. 
At the level of LDCs, these factors include market power at the farm-gate, a lack of 
capacity in producers and their organizations for direct market access and other 
capacity and information failures. That Fairtrade justifies its intervention of the basis 
of these is seen not only through their rhetoric, but in their active and targeted support 
of cooperative producer organizations. In its motivation and modus operandi, then, 
Fairtrade reflects elements of both the new international commodity policies, as well 
as of the older national commodity market policies of LDCs. As an example of the 
latter, the preoccupation with market power had been the impetus for numerous 
marketing board and producer price arrangements in the South. It was certainly the 
motivating force behind the elaborate regulatory system of Law 2762 in the Costa 
Rican coffee industry. This question is addressed through a case study of the Costa 
Rican coffee market. Using an original data series collected from fieldwork, this paper 
preliminarily assesses the market power justification and wider Fairtrade effect of 
Fairtrade intervention in the Costa Rican input market for coffee cherries. The results 
of the analysis simultaneously inform on the role of Fairtrade and, where this interacts 
with national and international policy tools, on the wider coffee commodity policy 
environment. 
Future research 
The analysis creates and makes available a firm-level panel data set of 21 variables 
over 26 years for the Costa Rican coffee sector.  The data set includes price, quantity 
and cost data and a variety of mill-specific characteristics including size, geography, 
bean type and industrial organization variables, as well as tax and policy variables. 
The process of collecting a coherent series provides a wide scope for further research 
in the Costa Rican coffee sector. The work undertaken for this analysis rendered the 
data set usable and provided an overview look of farm-gate pricing behavior in a 
selected commodity market, and the determinants of such.  
Recall that the research question addressed here had a wider scope than the 
measurement of market power. As such, the measure used only informs broadly on 
the market power question. Future research specifically aimed at the measurement of 
input market power in Costa Rica is desirable, not only in its own right, but to inform 
on the methodological identification procedure used in this application (namely, the 
reliance on cooperatives as the inefficient but honest benchmark).  
Other directions of future research include explicitly modeling the process by which 
Fairtrade cooperatives are chosen. Although the empirical work of the paper 
establishes a baseline result and methodology for assessing Fairtrade intervention, it is 
worthwhile thinking whether the selection of Fairtrade cooperatives can be   52
characterized and, importantly, whether doing so matters for the assessment of 
Fairtrade (see also footnote 46). 
Finally, the extension of the approach used in this paper to other coffee markets, or 
indeed, to other commodity markets, is desirable, particularly if the data supports the 
identification of multinational firms. This is to test the generalizability of the results 
found in Costa Rica concerning how producers fare in trade with multinationals. 
Certainly Fairtrade and multinationals make strange bedfellows, but the evidence 
suggests that value chain opposition to vertically integrated multinational firms in 
coffee on the grounds of producer welfare may be misguided.   
Conclusion 
In sum, underdevelopment is not simply a question of insufficient resource 
endowment, but rather about the organization of the economy generally and the 
functioning of its markets in particular. By placing the organization of the economy 
(rather than the specific level of resources) at the center of development analysis, the 
information theoretic approach to development calls for “…a better understanding of 
the microeconomics of LDCs” (Stiglitz 1989, p.202). That is, if development is 
impeded by failures in the functioning of the market, only policy that specifically 
addresses those failures can lead to development.   
The paper empirically evaluates the role of (non-Fairtrade price) Fairtrade 
intervention in international commodity markets. The failure of market power and low 
producer capacity in coffee markets in LDCs are identified as underlying causes of 
the low share of coffee returns faced by producers. In these respects at least, the role 
of Fairtrade is effective. Its support for cooperatives in mitigating market power is 
found not to be misplaced in Costa Rica.  Fairtrade mills also improve the returns to 
farmers through the improved efficiency of their organizations. Finally, the result that 
the sum of the coefficient quantifying the impact of cooperative organization on mill 
fixed-effect mark-downs and the separate ‘Fairtrade effect’ on mark-downs is not 
statistically distinct from the estimated coefficient on the effect of multinational firms, 
is an interesting one. One interpretation is that Fairtrade does for cooperatives what 
vertical integration into multinational firms does for the non-cooperative domestically 
owned firm. If that interpretation is accepted, then the decision to support Fairtrade or 
foster further foreign direct investment requires other information about the costs and 
benefits of Fairtrade. This may be the topic of a wider study on the role of Fairtrade in 
internationally traded commodities like coffee.   53
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